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I. INTRODUCTION
One begins to imagine 200 years of communication technology all coming
together at once when regulators, politicians, economists, and business leaders
talk about the promise of high-speed Internet access. The high capacity infra-
structures that provide broadband access are to the 21st century what roads,
canals, and railroads were to the 1800s and what basic telecommunications
services like the telephone and television were to the last century.' Politicians
in the Great Depression promised "a chicken in every pot and a car in every
garage."2 Today, broadband access for all Americans has become a political
and a business priority.'
An ambitious policy to develop a nationwide broadband pipeline plays a
critical role in shaping and developing the U. S. economy.4 One economic
study concluded that "the total annual benefits to the U.S. economy of the
I See Availability of Advanced Telecommunications Capability in the United States,
Fourth Report to Congress, in Dkt. No. 04-54, FCC 04-208, at 5 (Sept. 9, 2004) [hereinafter
Advanced Telecommunications Report] (dissenting statement of Commissioner Michael
Copps).
2 Anne Marie Squeo, Election Pledge: Broadband Access for All, WALL ST. J., Sept.
14, 2004, at A4 (stating that just as supporters of President Herbert Hoover during the Great
Depression made such aspirant promises, a nationwide broadband rollout has become an
important political issue).
3 David Lieberman, Election Should Be a Pro for Cable, No Matter Who Wins, USA
TODAY, Sept. 3, 2004, at B6.
4 Bryan Gruley, Pipe Dreams: Must AT&T Give Internet Rivals Access to TCI's Net-
work? WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 1999, at AI ("[T]he world is witnessing the birth of an industry
- with the Internet as its vehicle - that is motivating regular people to spend huge sums of
money ... Like the auto and steel industries of the early 20th century, online commerce is
changing the way the economy works.").
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widespread adoption of broadband access in all its forms-ADSL, cable mo-
dems, satellites, 3G wireless, and others--could be more than $400 billion per
year."5 The debate over widespread broadband deployment does not center on
necessity, but rather on the regulatory means to achieve this goal.' Communi-
cation regulators with different perspectives refer to broadband deployment as
"the central communication policy objective of the era"7 and a "central infra-
structure challenge."8
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("1996 Act"), which makes deregula-
tion of the communications industry a priority, encourages the widespread de-
5 Robert W. Crandall & Charles L. Jackson, The $500 Billion Opportunity: The Poten-
tial Economic Benefit of Widespread Diffusion of Broadband Internet Access, CRITERION
ECON., July 2001 at iv.
6 NewsHour with Jim Lehrer (PBS television broadcast, Aug. 21, 2001). In his first
interview as the newly appointed Federal Communications Commission Chairman, Michael
Powell told NewsHour media reporter Terence Smith that "the economic system that world
history has demonstrated maximizes consumer welfare more than others are those that make
efficient use of market mechanisms." Id. The Chairman argued that American market capi-
talism had proven over time to "maximize consumer welfare to a great degree." Id. From
his point of view, given the strength of the U.S. economy, the best means of achieving a
desired policy goal such as access to the Internet via broadband - any time, any where - is
through a market-oriented approach. All five Commissioners at the FCC agree Congress
charged the Commission with promoting national broadband deployment for all Americans,
but often disagree on how to achieve that goal. See generally Advanced Telecommunica-
tions Report, supra note 1, at 3-7. One side argues that the government's role should be to
facilitate competition within the broadband market in order to spur greater deployment. By
eliminating barriers to infrastructure investment, broadband deployment will be accelerated.
See Patrick Ross, White House Sees Regulation As Must in Promoting Broadband, Commu-
nications Daily, July 29, 2004, available at 2004 WL 60706753 ("Having the government
get out of the way [of the private sector as it deploys broadband] is an important goal.")(quoting Phil Bond, Under Secretary of Commerce for Technology, at a briefing for report-
ers on the Bush administration's efforts to promote multiple broadband options for consum-
ers). But see Advanced Telecommunications Report, supra note 1, at 5 (dissenting statement
of Commissioner Michael Copps) (arguing that market forces alone have not produced rapid
deployment to communities traditionally unserved in rural America and often "[t]he history
of great infrastructure developments in this country" point to private-public sector partner-
ships); see also Squeo, supra note 2 (summarizing the arguments made for a national broad-
band policy, finding that the central question remains: "should a nationwide broadband roll-
out be subsidized by the government ... "). Although the debate over federal subsidies for
broadband deployment continues, evidence points to a developing market environment en-
couraging growth in broadband services and investment. See, e.g., Advanced Telecommuni-
cations Report, supra note 1, at 14-23. As one newspaper reported, it's a "Free-for-All;
telecom companies [offering broadband] are invading one another's turf like never before"
which means lower prices and more choices for consumers. Almar Latour, Free-For-All,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 13, 2004, at Ri.
7 Jeff Pulver, VON Pioneers: FCC Chairman Michael Powell, VON MAGAZINE,
Sept./Oct. 2004, at 22.
8 Advanced Telecommunications Report, supra note 1, at 5 (dissenting statement of
Commissioner Michael Copps).
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ployment of broadband technology.9 Congress gave the Federal Communica-
tions Commission ("FCC" or "Commission") a policy goal to "encourage the
ubiquitous availability of broadband."'" While legislators provided grandiose
forethought, they offered few details on making it a reality. The 1996 Act
mandated that the FCC deploy advanced telecommunications capability on a
reasonable and timely basis to all Americans through "regulatory forbearance,
measures that promote competition .. .or other regulating methods that re-
move barriers to infrastructure investment.""
Unfortunately, the national communications policy decisions regulated by
the Act are not being formulated by administrative regulators experienced in
communications issues, but rather by federal circuit judges who often lack the
requisite experience in communication policy. 2 A particular instance of egre-
9 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (codified
in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.) (stating that the purpose of the act was "[t]o promote
competition and reduce regulation in order to secure lower prices and higher quality services
for American telecommunications consumers and encourage the rapid deployment of new
telecommunications technologies"). See also id §§706(a), (b), (c)(l), 110 Stat. 153 (set
forth as note following 47 U.S.C. §157 (2000)) ("The Commission ... shall encourage the
deployment of advanced telecommunications capability to all Americans." The statute de-
fines "advanced telecommunications capability" as "without regard to any transmission
media or technology, as high-speed, switched, broadband telecommunications capability
that enables users to originate and receive high-quality voice, data, graphics, and video tele-
communications using any technology.").
10 In re Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Wireline
Facilities, Universal Service Obligations of Broadband Providers, Notice of Proposed Rule-
making, 17 FCC Rcd. 3019, para. 3 (2002) [hereinafter Wireline Broadband NPRM].
II Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, §706(a), 110 Stat. 153 (note
following 47 U.S.C. §157 (2000)); see, e.g., id. §10(a)(3), (b), 110 Stat. 128 (codified as 47
U.S.C. §160 (2000));
[T]he Commission shall forbear from applying any regulation or any provision of this
Act to a ... telecommunications service, or class of... telecommunication services...
if the Commission determines that (3) forbearance of such regulation or provision is
not necessary with the public interest. (b) In making the determination under subsec-
tion (a)(3), the Commission shall consider whether forbearance from enforcing the
provision or regulation will promote competitive market conditions.
Id.; see also Advanced Telecommunications Report, supra note 1, at 8 (concluding advanced
telecommunications capability is currently being deployed on a reasonable and timely ba-
sis).
12 See generally Michael Botein, Judicial Review of FCC Action, 13 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 317, 324 (1995). Professor Botein has been a faculty member of the New York
Law School since 1977, and currently teaches Administrative Law, Mass Communications
and Telecommunications Law, and Media Law. He is the founding director of the Commu-
nications Media Center at the law school. This law review article was written because "[t]o
date, no secondary literature has addressed judicial review of FCC action in any detail." Id.
at 318. It was written to help FCC practitioners in the area of appellate work, which he
calls "difficult." Id. Much of the article discusses the "mutually exclusive" judicial review
provisions under the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. §402(a), (b). He writes an excellent
historical perspective about the exclusive review Congress gave the D.C. Circuit because of
"apparent goal ... to centralize judicial review of a then 'new technology' when the Radio
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gious judicial policy making is Brand X Internet Services v. Federal Commu-
nications Commission,"3 where the Ninth Circuit was asked to review the
FCC's regulatory classification of cable modem services under the 1996 Act,
based on the administrative record, the Commission's expertise in communica-
tions law, and its reasonable legal analysis given the Act's ambiguity. 4 The
Act of 1927 was passed. Id. at 324. Professor Botein points out that "the D.C. Circuit has
developed a formidable amount of expertise in communications" although he states "other
Courts of Appeals also have skills" in communications. Id. at 324-25. It is worth noting
that his article was written prior to the passage of the 1996 Act, which extended the D.C.
Circuit's exclusive jurisdiction under §402(b)(9) to review Bell Operating Company's entry
into interLata services described in §271. See Vernal Enters., Inc. v. FCC, 355 F.3d 650,
655 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (drawing distinctions between §§402(a) and (b) stating that §402(b)
"provides for appeal of FCC orders in nine enumerated situations"). Petitions for review of
rulemaking and non-licensing orders may be filed in any U.S. court of appeals where venue
exists under 47 U.S.C §402(a) (2000). Id. Professor Botein has a terrific quote by former
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court William Howard Taft, quite relevant to this article and
the timidity of federal courts to "make decisions in the area of high-technology." Botein,
supra note 12, at 343, n.35. Chief Justice Taft once complained about the Radio Act of
1927; "Interpreting the law on this subject is something like trying to interpret the law of the
occult. It seems like dealing with something supernatural." Id. at 324. These conclusions
by Mr. Botein prior to the 1996 Act make a stronger case for the arguments made by this
Comment and today's communication legal woes.
13 Brand X Internet Servs. v. FCC, 345 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2003); cert. granted 125
S.Ct. 655 (2004), and cert. granted, Nat. Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n, Inc. v. Brand X Inter-
net Servs., 125 S.Ct. 654 (2004) (cases consolidated).
'4 See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 397 (1999) (Souter, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) ("It would be gross understatement to say that the 1996
Act is not a model of clarity. That is most unfortunate for a piece of legislation that pro-
foundly affects a crucial segment of the economy worth tens of billions of dollars.") Both
the majority and the concurring opinion of Justice Souter agreed that under the Court's prior
decision in Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, the FCC merits defer-
ence when it reasonably interprets and implements disputed provisions found in the Tele-
communications Act of 1996. Id. To determine whether the FCC's analysis and conclusion
about an ambiguous issue could be deemed reasonably defensible, courts should ask "if the
question is sensible and the answer fair." Id. at 401. If so, "Chevron deference surely re-
quires us to respect the Commission's conclusion." Id. In AT&T Corp v. Iowa Utilities Bd.,
the Court held the Commission's interpretation of "necessary" and "impairment" require-
ments under 47 U.S.C. §251 for "network elements" primary unbundling rules was unrea-
sonable. Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia indicated that not only was the 1996 Act in
many respects "a model of ambiguity" but also self-contradictory. Id. at 397. However,
Congress knew the legislative ambiguities it chose to write in the 1996 Act, according to
Justice Scalia, would "be resolved by the implementing agency." Id. See also Richard
Murphy, A "New Counter-Marbury: Reconciling Skidmore Deference and Agency Interpre-
tive Freedom, 56 ADMIN. L. REv. 1, 2 (2004) ("A court conducting Chevron review checks
whether an agency's interpretation of a statute it administers falls within the zone of 'rea-
sonable' construction; that is, rather than determine 'what the law is,' the court instead de-
termines whether the agency has landed within what the law permits."). As discussed later,
the Ninth Circuit Court in BrandX Internet Service completely did away with Chevron def-
erence analysis regarding the FCC's regulatory conclusion with cable modem broadband.
See discussion infra Part III.
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Commission had concluded that "cable modem service, as it is currently of-
fered, is properly classified as an interstate information service, not as a cable
service, and that there is no separate offering of telecommunications service."' 5
The Ninth Circuit vacated the FCC's classification of cable modem service as
an "information service" under the 1996 Act.' 6 The court found that cable mo-
dem services should not be classified as either cable service (as Portland city
officials had previously argued to the court in AT&T v. City of Portland)7 or
information service (as the FCC eventually concluded), but rather a regulatory
classification that includes both a telecommunications service component in
addition to an information service. 8 Not to be usurped by the FCC, the Ninth
Circuit declared, "the FCC ... is not the only, not even the first, authoritative
body to have interpreted the provisions of the Communications Act as applied
to cable broadband service."'9 The court based its opinion on its redundant
prior case law.2" In essence, the judges appointed themselves ad-hoc FCC
15 In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other
Facilities, Declaratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 FCC Rcd. 4798,
para. 7 (2002), rev'd in part, vacated in part by, Brand X Internet Servs. v. FCC, 345 F.3d
1120 (2003) [hereinafter Cable Declaratory Ruling].
16 BrandXlnternet Servs., 345 F.3d at 1132.
17 216 F.3d 871, 878 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding Internet services provided by cable facili-
ties contained both information service and telecommunications service components under
the Telecommunications Act of 1996); see also discussion infra Parts III.A. 1, 2.
18 Id. at 1125. The court in AT&T v. City of Portland and BrandX made it explicitly
clear "that the FCC has declined, both in its regulatory capacity and as amicus curiae, to
address the issue" before the court, failing to take a position from the onset. BrandXInter-
net Servs., 345 F.3d at 1125, 1131, citing City of Portland, 216 F.3d at 876. But see United
States Telecomm. Ass'n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554, 588 (D.C. Cir. 2004) ("The FCC generally
has broad discretion to control the disposition of its caseload, and to defer consideration of
particular issues to future proceedings when it thinks that doing so would be conducive to
the efficient dispatch of business.").
'9 BrandXlnternet Servs., 345 F.3d at 1127.
20 BrandX Internet Servs., 345 F.3d at 1132 ("Our holding in Mesa Verde along with
that of the Supreme Court in Neal, requires our adherence to the interpretation of the Com-
munications Act we announced in Portland "); see also Neal v. U.S., 516 U.S. 284, 295
(1996) ("Once we have determined a statute's meaning, we adhere to our ruling under the
doctrine of stare decisis, and we assess an agency's later interpretation of the statute against
that settled law."); see also Mesa Verde Constr. Co. v. N. Cal. Dist. Council of Laborers,
861 F.2d 1124, 1136 (9th Cir. 1988) (providing for an exception where precedent conflicts
with an agency's subsequent interpretation "if a panel finds that [an agency] interpretation
of the [federal] laws is reasonable and consistent with those laws, the panel may adopt that
interpretation even if circuit precedent is to the contrary" but the Mesa rule is qualified in
cases involving Chevron deference of an administrative agency statutory construction and
reasoned decision making); see, e.g., Cable Declaratory Ruling, supra note 15, at para. 57
(comparing the Ninth Circuit's decision in City of Portland on "a record that was less than
comprehensive" to a record compiled in "this proceeding, developed over a course of a year
through written comments and replies ... fully address[ing] the classification issue...").
The court in Brand X pointed out that it did not apply Chevron doctrine to its previous deci-
sion involving cable modem broadband, and furthermore, it did not find the Communica-
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Commissioners and imposed their own vision of national broadband policy.
The importance of a coherent national broadband policy surrounding the
growth of communications technology makes it a priority to develop a fair and
efficient administrative review procedure from one well-versed and fully com-
petent circuit court.2' In Brand X, seven different petitions were filed in the
Third, Ninth, and District of Columbia Circuit Courts. Each sought review of
the FCC's classification of cable modem as an information service, insisting
the Commission "should have made an additional determination."22 Current
rules allow litigants to file petitions for review of such orders in various courts
of appeals, within ten days of the issuance of a Commission Order and its pub-
lication in the Federal Register, litigants can.23 Under 28 U.S.C. §2112, these
various petitions to review administrative orders trigger a lottery conducted by
the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation.24 Emerging communications
technologies and the ambiguities of the 1996 Act make it difficult for jurists to
draw boundaries between deciding what the law is and writing communication
policy. 5 Of the federal circuit courts, the D.C. Circuit has the most experience
in reviewing communications rules and regulations because of its exclusive
appellate jurisdiction authorized by the Communications Act.26 This Comment
tions Act to be ambiguous on this issue. BrandXlnternet Servs., 345 F.3d at 1131. But cf
Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n, Inc. v. Gulf Power., 534 U.S. 327, 347 (2002) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("[T]he Commission clearly [needs to] explain the
specific statutory basis on which it is regulating rates for [pole] attachments that provide...
high-speed Internet access. [That] would require the [FCC to finally conclude whether
broadband services] provided through cable wires constitutes cable service or telecommuni-
cations service or falls into neither category.").
21 Compare AT&T v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d at 877 (determining whether the City of
Portland could condition the transfer of a local franchise agreement subject to opening ac-
cess to cable facilities for competing Internet Service Providers (ISPs) required the court to
define Internet services under the Communications Act) with MediaOne Group, Inc. v.
County of Henrico, Va., 257 F.3d 356, 359, 366 (4th Cir. 2001) (finding a county ordinance
conditioning approval of transfer of cable TV franchise on the franchisee's granting other
ISPs access to its cable modem platform preempted by federal law).
22 BrandX Internet Servs., 345 F.3d at 1127.
23 See, e.g., Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 388 (3rd Cir. 2004)
("Within days of the publication of the Order, several organizations filed petitions for re-
view . . . in various courts of appeals, some contending that the Commission had gone too
far in revising [media ownership] rules, and asserting that the Commission had not gone far
enough.").
24 28 U.S.C. §2112(a)(3) (2000).
25 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (Justice Marshall declared
for the Court the "province and duty... to say what the law is"). Compare AT&T Corp. v.
Iowa Utilities Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 397 (1999) ("It would be gross understatement to say that
the 1996 Act is not a model of clarity ... We can only enforce the clear limits that the 1996
Act contains.") with Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n, Inc. v. Gulf Power, 534 U.S. 327, 329(2002) ("[T]he subject matter here is technical, complex, and dynamic; and as a general
rule, agencies have authority to fill gaps where the statutes are silent.").
26 See generally 47 U.S.C. §402(b)(l)-(9) (2000).
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argues that the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit should have exclusive jurisdiction under 47 U.S.C. §402(b) to review
FCC development of a national policy over the widespread deployment of
broadband as mandated by Congress.
Consistent with section 230(b)(2) of the Act, the FCC has sought to "pre-
serve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the
Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State
regulation" consistent with section 230(b)(2) of the Act.27 Part II of this Com-
ment discusses the regulatory classifications that various communications ser-
vices merit under the 1996 Act. This section contends a market-oriented ap-
proach will spur the growth and development of broadband, and demonstrates
how the Commission, encouraged by Congress, has followed this economic
justification with positive results. The FCC has the unique capability and ex-
pertise to develop a national policy that promotes and implements the wide-
spread deployment of broadband through deregulation. Part III compares how
two circuit courts applied Chevron deference to FCC administrative decision
making when faced with difficult legal questions about cable modem service.
This Comment criticizes the Ninth Circuit's decision in AT&T v. Portland, a
decision the court later upheld when it usurped FCC authority in BrandX.2"
In Part IV, this Comment analyzes the Supreme Court's decision in NCTA v.
Gulf Power,29 holding that the FCC was given wide discretion by Congress to
develop a national broadband policy.3" Although the issue of regulatory
Appeals may be taken from decisions and orders of the Commission to the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in any of the following cases: (1)
by any applicant for a construction permit or station license whose application is de-
nied ... (2) renewal or modification of any such instrument of authorization ... (3) ap-
plication for authority to transfer, assign, or dispose of any such instrument of authori-
zation ... (4) applicant for the permit required by section 325 of this title ... (5) holder
of any construction permit or station license which has been modified or revoked ... (6)
any other person who is aggrieved or whose interests are adversely affected by any or-
der of the Commission granting or denying any application described in (1)-(4) and (9)
... (7) by any person upon whom an order to cease and desist has been served under
section 312, (8) by any radio operator whose license has been suspended by the Com-
mission, and (9) by any applicant for authority to provide interLATA services under
section 271 of this title whose application is denied by the Commission.
Id.
27 Cable Declaratory Ruling, supra note 15, at paras. 4-5; see 47 U.S.C. §230(b)(2)
(2000).
28 William T. Lake & Matthew A. Brill, Jury Still Out on Access to Cable, FULTON
COUNTY DAILY REPORT, July 24, 2000, at 8. Although the Ninth Circuit said in Portland
that "the FCC has 'broad authority to forbear from enforcing the telecommunications provi-
sions" it had decided upon, the commentators noted that "the agency must justify a decision
to forbear, and it might be pressed to explain why it should forbear from regulating cable
modem service but not competing DSL service." Id.
29 Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n, Inc. v. Gulf Power Co., 534 U.S. 327 (2002).
30 Id. at 339.
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classification for cable modem service came before the Court, the majority in
Gulf Power concluded the subject matter of defining the regulatory scheme of
cable modem service was "technical, complex, and dynamic; and, as a general
rule, agencies have authority to fill gaps where statutes are silent." 3' Part IV
examines the FCC's reaction to Gulf Power by adopting its Cable Declaratory
Ruling, finally giving regulatory certainty to the Congressional mandate "to
encourage the deployment of advanced telecommunications capability to all
Americans" and, if necessary, "to accelerate deployment of such capability by
removing barriers to infrastructure investment. 3
In Part V, this Comment criticizes the Ninth Circuit's holding in Brand X
for substituting its own policy preference for Congress' and the FCC by way of
stare decisis.33 This Comment argues that although the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Brand
Xlnternet Services v. FCC, the Court is unlikely to resolve the current dispute
between the Ninth Circuit and the FCC on the merits of the case. Instead the
Court will most likely address the "significant conflict in the circuit courts
concerning the interaction of the Chevron doctrine with the rule of stare de-
cisis. ' '34  Part V argues that the Supreme Court's decision in BrandX will not
resolve the foreseeable long-term litigation problems faced by the FCC sur-
rounding immerging technologies, statutory interpretation of the Communica-
tions Act, and multi-circuit litigation involving broadband policy. 5
In Part VI, this Comment examines the Administrative Orders Review Act
31 Id. The Court stated that if parts of the 1996 Act were ambiguous, "the FCC's read-
ing must be accepted nonetheless, provided it is a reasonable interpretation." Id. at 333.
Justices Thomas and Souter dissented in Gulf Power arguing "the FCC failed to engage in
reasoned decision making." Id. at 347.
32 The Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, §706(a)-(c), 110 Stat.
153 (note following 47 U.S.C. § 157 (2000)) (defining "advanced telecommunications capa-
bility" as "high-speed, switched broadband telecommunications").
33 See generally Brand X Internet Servs. v. FCC, 345 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2003).
34 Appellate Brief for the Federal Petitioners, 2005 WL 122088, at 39, FCC v. Brand X
Internet Servs., 2125 S.Ct. 655 (2004) (No. 04-281), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 655 (2004);
see also Ross A. Bunstrock & Michael B. Hazzard, FCC Appeals "Brand X" Decision to
Supreme Court, WOMBLE CARLYLE, at http://www.wcsr.com/FSL5CS/telecom-
municationsmemos (Sept. 1, 2004) (noting the FCC's appeal of the BrandX decision raises
significant legal and policy issues that may be of significant interest to the Supreme Court).
35 Vonage Holdings Corp. v. Minn. Pub. Utilities Comm'n, 394 F.3d 568 (8th Cir.
2004) (upholding lower court ruling that the State of Minnesota was prohibited from regu-
lating Internet based phone calling ("voice over the Internet protocol" or "VoIP") because
such service should be properly defined not a telecommunications but rather an information
service); see also In re Vonage Holdings Corp. Petition for Declaratory Ruling Concerning
an Order of the Minnesota Public Utilities Comm'n, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 19
FCC Rcd. 22404, para. 1 (2004) [hereinafter Vonage Order] (preempting state utilities
commission from applying its traditional telephone company regulations to VolP service).
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("Hobbs Act"),36 47 U.S.C. §§402(a), (b) and 28 U.S.C. §2112, which embod-
ies the statutory scheme that provides for judicial review of FCC orders. This
present statutory scheme, arguably, gives rise to the same appellate procedural
problem that allowed the Ninth Circuit to overrule the FCC's findings in Brand
X. An aggrieved litigant can invoke Hobbs Act jurisdiction by simply asking a
circuit court of appeals to review the FCC's final orders consistent with 47
U.S.C. §402(a).3 7 At this stage, often time multiple parties file petitions for
review in various circuit courts, resulting in venue selection by lottery under 28
U.S.C §2112's regime. Under 47 U.S.C §402(b), however, the D.C. Circuit
has unique statutory competence over communications law and policy based
on the sheer number of communications litigants that seek judicial review in its
court, which in essence, gives the D.C. Circuit de facto primary jurisdiction
over communications matters. 9 This Comment then analyzes the statutory
construction of 47 U.S.C. §402(a) and (b), arguing that Congress intended the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia to have broader
jurisdiction over national communications policy against the backdrop of 28
U.S.C. §2112(a)(5).4" This Comment concludes that Congress should amend
36 28 U.S.C §2342 (1) (2000) ("The court of appeals ... has exclusive jurisdiction to
enjoin, set aside, suspend (in whole or in part), or to determine the validity of (1) all final
orders of the Federal Communications Commission made reviewable by §402(a).").
37 See generally FCC v. ITT World Communications, Inc., 466 U.S. 463 (1984).
38 Brand X Internet Servs., 345 F.3d at 1127. At this point, the outcome of an FCC
order such as the Cable Declaratory Ruling is not determinate on the agency's analysis, but
rather the chance that the court selected will apply administrative law in a reasonable man-
ner.
39 CHARLES H. KOCH, 3 ADMiN. L. & PRAC. § 13.23, n.l (2d ed. 2004) ("Primary juris-
diction, like exhaustion, allows complex questions to be answered in a uniform manner by
one agency, rather than many different courts."). See also Milne Truck Line, Inc. v. Makita
U.S.A., Inc., 970 F.2d 564, 569, n.4 (9th Cir. 1992) ("The doctrine of primary jurisdiction..
. requires referral to the appropriate administrative body 'whether enforcement of [a] claim
requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within
the special competence of [that] administrative body" (quoting U.S. v. Western Pac. R.R
Co., 352 U.S. 59, 64 (1956)). Similar to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, which pro-
motes uniform legal application, the District of Columbia Circuit has a unique "business"
relationship with the FCC and Congress should mandate by statute that this court exercise
exclusive jurisdiction on all broadband issues in the first instance. See supra text accompa-
nying note 12.
40 28 U.S.C. §2112(a)(5) (2000) (circuit courts of appeals are encouraged to "transfer all
proceedings with respect to the order to any other court of appeals for the convenience of
the parties in the interest of justice."); see United States Telecomm. Ass'n v. FCC, 359 F.3d
554, 564 (D.C. Cir. 2004) ("Various CLECs, state commissions, and an association of state
utility consumer advocates filed petitions for review in several other circuits; these petitions
were transferred to the Eighth Circuit under the random lottery procedure established in 28
U.S.C §2112(a)(3), and then transferred to this court by the Eighth Circuit under 28 U.S.C.
§2112(a)(5)."). It may be unrealistic or inefficient to expect that all judicial matters involv-
ing national communications policy will be voluntarily transferred to one appeals court such
as the D.C. Circuit as some may counter-argue because either a communications issue af-
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47 U.S.C. §402(b), as it begins to rewrite the Telecommunications Act of
1996, and grant the D.C. Circuit exclusive jurisdiction to review administrative
decisions and orders involving broadband regulation."
II. DEREGULATING "INFORMATION SERVICES" HOLDS THE KEY
TO SUCCESS
A. Classifying Communication Services Under the 1996 Act
Congress passed the Telecommunications Act of 1996 in part to encourage
innovation while protecting the public from communications markets domi-
nated by monopolies.42 The 1996 Act made sweeping changes to the Commu-
fecting national policy may not involve the FCC directly or circuit courts may not be willing
to give deference to the D.C. Circuit. See, e.g., Vonage Holdings Corp., 394 F.3d at 569(stating that a dispute between a state public utilities commission and a private corporation
providing interstate VoIP service was not a Hobbs Act petition for review case). Compare
In re 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review-Review of the Commission's Broadcast Owner-
ship Rules and other Rules Adopted Pursuant to §202 of the Telecommunications Act of
1996, Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 18 F.C.C. Rcd. 13,620 (July
2, 2003), aff'd in part, rem 'd in part, Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 389
n 11 (3rd Cir. 2004) (stating that the Deregulatory Petitioners raised threshold argument that
previous D.C. Circuit rulings regarding various Media Ownership Rules provided "the law
of the case" because FCC "Order results in part from the D.C. Circuit Court's remand in
those two decisions;" and holding the law of the case doctrine did not constrain review be-
cause "case involve[d] ... comprehensive reexamination of a larger set of its broadcast
ownership rules, in which a different set of parties participated, a different record was com-
piled, and different results were reached"); with Fox Television Stations v. FCC, 280 F.3d
1027, 1048 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (construing the 1996 Act to "carr[y] with it a presumption in
favor of repealing or modifying the ownership rules") amended by, 293 F.3d 537, 540 (D.C.
Cir. 2002) (holding that the FCC had not sufficiently explained its reasons for retaining
either the national television owners rule set at 35% by Congress and its cable/broadcast
cross-ownership rule after determining that both rules remained "necessary in the public
interest"). See also Sinclair Broadcast Group, Inc. v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148, 152 (D.C. Cir.
2002) ("Commission has failed to demonstrate that its exclusion of non-broadcast media in
the eight voices exception [to the local ownership rule] is not arbitrary and capricious...
remand the local ownership rule to the Commission for further consideration.").
41 47 U.S.C §402(b)(l)-(9) (2000). The statute states in relevant part that parties can
appeal a Commission order to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia in nine various instances. Congress amended §402(b) in the 1996 Act which implicated
national policy (market entry and competition of local and long distance calling). See The
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 107, §276 (1996). Section
9 was added to 47 U.S.C. §402 (b) providing the right to appeal exclusively to the D. C.
Circuit "by any applicant for authority to provide interLATA services under section 271 of
this Act whose application is denied by the Commission." Id. §402(b)(9). Congress could
again amend 47 U.S.C. §402(b) to include issues pertaining to national broadband policy.
42 Robert Cannon, Where Internet Service Providers and Telephone Companies Com-
pete: A Guide to the Computer Inquires, Enhanced Service Providers and Information Ser-
vice Providers, 9 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 49, 52 (2001) ("The telephone market, as the
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nications Act of 1934, amending and modifying certain portions while adding
new sections to accommodate technological changes and create a new com-
petitive environment.13 Title I now regulates information and enhanced service
providers; common carriers are regulated under Title 11; wireless providers
under Title Ill; and cable television companies are regulated as Title VI pro-
viders." Congress charged the Commission with developing a national policy
to give all Americans access to Internet broadband services by promoting
competition and innovation for the delivery of such services and removing
regulatory barriers that discourage infrastructure investment.45 Congress made
it a primary policy goal for the FCC to write and update a detailed deregulatory
framework that implements the basic intent of the 1996 Act.46
result of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 is experiencing transformation, moving from
a market dominated by monopolies to a market with new entrants bringing new services,
new choices and new prices to consumers.").
43 See 47 U.S.C. §230(b)(2) (2000) ("It is the policy of the United States ... to preserve
the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other inter-
active computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation..."); see also Leonard J.
Kennedy & Lori A Zallaps, If It Ain't Broke . .. The FCC and Internet Regulation, 7
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 17, 17 (1999) ("Rather than relying on government regulation to
shape the Internet, Congress mandated reliance upon the market.").
44 See generally 47 U.S.C. §§160, 251. 332, 521 (2000); see also PAUL VALLE-RIESTRA,
TELECOMMUNICATIONS: THE GOVERNMENT ROLE IN MANAGING THE CONNECTED COMMU-
NITY, 15-20 (2002). Although the 1996 Act added the distinctive terms such as "telecommu-
nications" and "information" services to the Communications Act, historically, these regula-
tory classifications developed in the mid 1960s. In 1966, as Mr. Valle-Riestra recalls, "the
FCC initiated a series of proceedings in order to create regulatory distinctions between the
treatment of computers involved in transmitting user messages (i.e., telecommunications
services) and the treatment of computers involved in data processing, which the FCC ini-
tially termed 'enhanced' services." Id. at 18; see also Cable Declaratory Ruling, supra note
15, at n.139.
These decisions drew a distinction between bottleneck common carrier facilities and
services for the transmission or movement of information on the one hand and, on the
other, the use of computer processing applications to act on the content, code, protocol,
or other aspects of the subscriber's information. The latter are 'enhanced' or informa-
tion services ... The Commission has confirmed that the two terms-enhanced services
and information services-should be interpreted to extend to the same functions.
Id; see generally In re Implementation of the Non-Accounting Safeguards of Sections 271
and 272 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, CC Docket No. 96-149, First
Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 11 FCC Rcd. 21905, para.
102 (1996) [hereinafter Non-Accounting Safeguards Order]. With this much history, it can
be argued that the FCC has been uniquely involved with these regulatory distinction much
longer than any stare decisis case the Ninth Circuit Court may arbitrarily use to usurp FCC
authority.
45 Wireline Broadband NPRM, supra note 10, at paras. 3, 5.
46 See Wireline Broadband NPRM, supra note 10, at para. 4; cf AT&T v. Iowa Utilities
Board, 525 U.S. 366, 397 (1999) ("Congress is well aware that the ambiguities it chooses to
produce in [the 1996 Act] will be resolved by the implementing agency."); see generally
Chevron USA Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). The
FCC is entitled to considerable deference in its interpretation of provisions of the Commu-
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The 1996 Act defines telecommunications service as "the offering of tele-
communications for a fee directly to the public, or to such classes of users as to
be effectively available directly to the public, regardless of the facilities
used."47 Congress differentiated between telecommunications service and tele-
communications by defining the latter as "the transmission, between or among
points specified by the user, of information of the user's choosing, without
change in the form or content of the information as sent and received."48 In
order to differentiate between "telecommunications" and "information service"
the Act defines information services as:
The offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, re-
trieving, utilizing, or making available information via telecommunications, and includes
electronic publishing, but does not include any use of any such capability for the manage-
ment, control or operation of a telecommunications system or the management of a tele-
49
communications service.
These regulatory classifications radically changed the structure and direction of
the communications environment, which was already competitive.0
Communications technology altered the way we communicate by "improv-
ing raw message transmission services (or 'telecommunications services')
through new technologies ...as well as in facilitating the provision of en-
hanced data processing and content services (or 'information services') such as
voicemail and caller ID."' The FCC's regulatory classifications are important
nications Act when its interpretation is reasonable and apparent.
47 47 U.S.C. § 153(46) (2000).
48 Id. §153(43) (2000); see Cable Declaratory Ruling, supra note 15, at para. 40
("[T]he Act distinguishes 'telecommunications' from "telecommunications service."' The
Commission has previously recognized that "all information services require the use of tele-
communications to connect customers to the computers or other processors that are capable
of generating, storing, or manipulating information. Although the transmission of informa-
tion to and from these computers may constitute 'telecommunications,' that transmission is
not necessarily a separate 'telecommunications service'."); see also Implementation of the
Non-Accounting Safeguards of Section 271 and 272 of the Communications Act of 1934, as
amended, CC Docket No. 96-149, Order on Remand ("Non-Accounting Safeguards Re-
mand"), 16 FCC Rcd. 9751, para. 16 ("The transmission of information [services] to and
from these computers ... does not alter the form or content of the information ... [A]s ex-
plicitly stated in the statutory definition, [information services are] conveyed 'via telecom-
munications' whether or not the telecommunications component is separately supplied by
either the provider or the customer."); see also Cannon, supra note 42, at 50 ("Basic tele-
communications services are the offering of pure transmission capacity where the user's
information is transmitted transparently across the network.").
49 47 U.S.C. §153(20) (2000); see also Cable Declaratory Ruling, supra note 15, at
para. 34.
50 Barbara Esbin, Internet Over Cable: Defining the Future in Terms of the Past, 7
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 37, 38 (1999) ("[T]he Telecommunications Act of 1996 ... radi-
cally restructured the regulatory landscape for the provision of local telephone communica-
tions services, attaching significant new consequences to statutory definitions derived from
the technologies of the past.").
51 VALLE-RIESTRA, supra note 44, at 18 ("[W]ith the increasing sophistication and pro-
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because each regulated industry operates under vastly different rules." Tele-
communications services, which are subject to Title II common carrier provi-
sions and obligations, are heavily regulated. 3 Cable television operators are
exempted from Title 1I regulation as long as they deliver cable services, which
include video, data, and voice communications. 4 The FCC "deliberately struc-
tured [a] dualism" regulatory jurisdiction, maintaining "exclusive authority
over all operational aspects of cable communication, including technical stan-
dards and signal carriage," while granting state and local government franchise
authority.5 Legacy regulatory frameworks do not burden information services,
which are mutually exclusive from telecommunications services. 6  Even
though "Internet access, like all information services, is provided 'via tele-
liferation of computer applications, it is often difficult to distinguish between telecommuni-
cations services, information services, and other types of services.").
52 Christian R. Eriksen, Cable Broadband: Did the Ninth Circuit Beat the FCC to the
Punch in Last Mile Regulation? 6 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 283, 283 (2004) ("The
classification largely determines what regulatory scheme is applied.").
53 47 U.S.C. § 153(46) (2000); see Cannon, supra note 42, at 50 ("Enhanced services are
not regulated under Title II; rather, they are effectively 'unregulated' by the Commission.").
According to Mr. Cannon, enhanced or information services, which Internet services fall
under, offer more than telecommunications services. In the former, the "user-supplied in-
formation interacts with the services on the network; and there is some degree of computer
processing and modification of the user's information, or the creation of new information in
response to user command." Id.
54 47 U.S.C. §541(c) (2000); see generally James B. Speta, Handicapping the Race for
the Last Mile?: A Critique of Open Access Rules for Broadband Platforms, 17 YALE J. ON
REG. 39, 72 (2000) ("[C]able services are exempt from the sort of common carrier, inter-
connection, and unbundling duties applied to telecommunications carriers."). Professor
Speta analyzed the various Internet platforms available to consumers (wireline, cable, wire-
less, and satellite) and evaluated the various FCC regulations that could stifle or spur inno-
vation over the broadband technologies. He concluded consumers can benefit the most from
adopting the cable broadband access platform and making it "applicable to all carriers de-
ploying broadband information services." Id. at 90. He argues that strong competition
among different delivery technologies "that promise to provide the 'last mile' of access
should not be burdened with interconnection duties that will be unnecessary and unwise. Id.
This type of deregulation will permit "consumers to take advantage of new information
services in their home." Id. But see Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-
To-End: Preserving the Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L.
REv. 925, 971 (2001) ("If one is generally predisposed to keep the government's hands off
the market, this is exactly the wrong way to go about it.").
55 New York State Comm'n on Cable Television v. FCC, 749 F.2d 804, 809 (D.C. Cir.
1984). See 47 U.S.C. §541(a)(2) (2000); see, e.g., Esbin, supra note 50, at 83 ("Congress
enacted legislation expressly designed to (de) regulate cable television, establish the
boundaries of federal, state and local authority over cable systems, and establish franchise
procedures and standards to encourage the growth and development of cable system."). For
an excellent analysis of the legislative history behind the Cable Act of 1984, read further
Ms. Esbin's article, as she establishes Congress' intent to exempt cable services from Title
II regulation.
56 In re Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, Report to Congress, 13 FCC
Rcd. 11830, para. 82 (1998) [hereinafter Universal Service Report].
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communications,' [such] information service providers are not subject to regu-
lation as common carriers." 7 Regulating services such as broadband over ca-
ble modem has become more complex with the development of new technolo-
gies and convergence with older technologies.58
B. FCC Reports to Congress on Broadband Deployment
The FCC plays a vital role in implementing congressional mandates, such as
broadband deployment, through regulations. 9 In its Fourth Report to Con-
gress on the Availability of Advanced Telecommunications Capability in the
United States ("Advanced Telecommunications Report"), the FCC documented
"the significant development of new Internet-based services, and new access
technology."6 The Advanced Telecommunications Report found that broad-
band is being deployed to different parts of the country on a reasonable and
timely fashion because of private market mechanisms.6' In terms of broadband
subscribers, the United States has the largest market of absolute numbers,
while the United States ranked eleventh overall in residential broadband pene-
tration.62 The FCC has achieved its legislative mandate to promote the wide-
57 Id. at paras. 13, 68. As mentioned earlier in this Comment, the FCC has reached the
conclusion in previous reports that "information services are offered 'via telecommunica-
tions,' [so therefore] they necessarily require a transmission component in order for users to
access information. It is this administrative finding that helped the Commission "find that
Internet access services are appropriately classed as information, rather than telecommunica-
tions, services." Id. at paras. 57, 73.
58 Esbin, supra note 50, at 42 ("While the Internet arguably represents one form of
technological and service 'convergence,' the 1996 Act's deregulatory, pro-competitive pro-
gram depends upon the viability of distinct regulatory categories for services, facilities, and
service providers to establish the rights and obligations of carriers as competition is intro-
duced to formerly monopoly-based markets.").
59 See Advanced Telecommunications Report, supra note 1, at 5.
60 Id. at 1.
61 Id. at 2-3 (finding a continuing positive trend of having more advanced telecommuni-
cations capabilities available to consumers "who stand in particular need of advanced ser-
vices" such as rural areas, low income, and people with disabilities). One way the Commis-
sion can meet the challenge of helping to "deploy and improve advanced services," accord-
ing to this Report, is by creating "a policy environment that focuses on all broadband access
technologies that provide value to consumers." Id. at 92.
62 Id. at 80-81. Although the majority of the Commission championed the growth of
nationwide broadband through deregulation, Commissioner Michael Copps dissented from
the FCC's approach to broadband deployment. Commissioner Copps found it incredulous
that the Advanced Telecommunications Report would conclude that Congress's mandate of
ubiquitous broadband was being deployed in a timely manner, given America's poor show-
ing in its international ranking. "This Report somehow finds that this is acceptable," Com-
missioner Copps said of the U.S. being ranked eleventh overall in residential broadband
penetration among all nations, "and that our efforts are resulting in timely deployment. I
think our efforts are insufficient and that broadband deployment is insufficient." Id. at 105.
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spread deployment of Internet broadband to most Americans by adopting a
market-oriented approach, giving the business sector the regulatory flexibility
to bring future innovation, technology, and services to consumers.63
The Commission makes important policy decisions when defining the regu-
latory classifications in the various communications services because each
regulated telecommunications industry operates under vastly different rules.'
For example, although the FCC regulates the cable industry under one set of
63 Id. at 96. (stating that "across America, the availability of ubiquitous, reliable broad-
band access is changing the way we work and live.") (statement of former Chairman Mi-
chael K. Powell).
64 E.g., Eriksen, supra note 52, at 283, 293, n.3 ("Traditionally the telecommunications
sector has been the most regulated. Cable has had minimal regulation and information ser-
vices have had almost no regulation."); see also Lemley and Lessig, supra note 54, at 925.
Professors Lemley and Lessig argue that the FCC lacks an understanding of the Internet's
architectural end-to-end design. The authors argue that when it comes to the question of
"open access" by the cable industry, the FCC "does not adequately evaluate the potential
threat that bundling presents to open access to the Internet." Id. Cable companies should
not be given special treatment when it comes to open access of the data pipeline to competi-
tors, unlike telephone companies. Id. at 928. By taking a "hands off' approach, Professors
Lemley and Lessig argue that the FCC's policies "will ultimately lead to more rather than
less regulation," increasing prices in the broadband market and harming innovation. Id. at
925, 951. The authors suggest that every data pipeline into the home should be a shared
entrance by all competitors, including the thousands of ISPs. Id. at 941. However, such an
open doorway provides little incentive for anyone to build faster networks, costing consum-
ers more money. Compare Speta, supra note 54, at 85, 87 ("Legal rules requiring open
access are likely to impose significant costs... [O]pen access rules that attempt to mimic
perfectly competitive markets may decrease the broadband access provider's incentives to
deploy the platforms in the first instance."), with David McCourt, The Telecom (Better Late
Than Never) Revolution, WALL ST. J., Jan. 4, 2005, at B8 (stating that the explosion of
Internet use via multiple broadband platforms drives residential telecommunications, "mak-
ing it possible for phone calls, music, movies and Web pages to be delivered over a single
network to the home.") David McCourt argues that, "for such a system to work, the compa-
nies that build or own their own networks need to be free to redefine what telecommunica-
tions means without running the gantlet of regulation." By arguing for unregulated "open
access," Professors Lemley and Lessig would compel government-backed regulation en-
forced by the FCC mandating "open access conditions on cable companies without replicat-
ing the complex regulatory scheme." Lemley and Lessig, supra note 54, at 969. Contrary
to what the authors suggest, there is a plethora of evidence that innovation and competition
for information services continues in a deregulatory environment. Compare Jesse Drucker,
Internet Calling May Go Wireless As Cellphone Firms Seek to Tap In, WALL ST. J., Nov. 9,
2004, at D3 ("[M]ore cellular operators are interested in using cellphones that have Internet
calling capabilities, too, via ... Wi-Fi [technology which] can improve calling quality inside
of buildings for less money."), with Almar Latour, Showdown of the Giants: Verizon, SBC
Saddle Up to Compete Head to Head with Cable in TV Service, WALL ST. J., Nov. 8, 2004,
at B 1; see also Jesse Drucker, Dennis K. Berman, and Peter Grant, Cable Titans Discuss
Offering Cellular Service, Intensifying Foray Into Telecom's Turf WALL ST. J., Nov. 8,
2004, at B1 ("[l]n the war between telephone and cable operators [both] lack one key offer-
ing: telephone companies can't offer video services, and cable companies don't provide
cellular services. To combat those deficits, telephone companies ... are planning to build
fiber-optic networks to bring video to customers.").
2005]
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
rules when providing video services, the question then becomes what should
be the policy and regulation for cable entities that provide broadband delivered
through its pipelines. Should cable broadband be classified as a telecommuni-
cations, cable, or information service?" Congress did not clearly indicate in
the 1996 Act how cable modem service should be classified or regulated.66
Regulatory classifications, either by the FCC or the courts, have conse-
quences.67 If the FCC classified broadband delivery through cable modem as
an interstate information service, such reasoned policy would have national
implications. Having multiple parties lend their expertise and opinion to the
administrative process would lend credibility and support to the decision mak-
ing role of the FCC. Likewise, important goals set out by Congress such as the
development, investment, and widespread broadband deployment through de-
regulation would be implemented. 6
C. Promoting Broadband Competition Through Market Forces
People refer to broadband69 almost with religious-like fervor, looking upon
65 VALLE-RIESTRA, supra note 51, at 19 ("The 1982 consent decree settling the antitrust
lawsuit against AT&T distinguished between 'telecommunications' and 'information' ser-
vices . . . 'Information service' was defined similarly, but slightly more broadly than the
FCC's term 'enhanced service'."). According to the author, these regulatory services de-
fined in the AT&T consent decree were adopted by Congress in the 1996 Act. See gener-
ally U.S. v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 179 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd sub nom. Maryland v. U.S.,
460 U.S. 1001, (1983); see also Cable Declaratory Ruling, supra note 15, at n.139.
66 Cable Declaratory Ruling, supra note 15, para. 32 ("[T]he relevant statutory provi-
sions do not yield easy or obvious answers to the questions at hand; and the case law inter-
preting those provisions is extensive and complex.").
67 Esbin, supra note 50, at 39 (asserting the regulatory status of Internet-based services
such as broadband over cable "arises as a result of revisions to the definition of 'cable ser-
vices' contained in the 1996 Act ... How the FCC resolves issues concerning Internet access
and the provision of Internet-based communications services by cable operators has vast
implications for both providers and consumers of Internet-based services.").
68 See THOMAS HAZLETT ET AL., Sending the Right Signals: Promoting Competition
Through Telecommunications Reform, A Report to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Sept.
22, 2004 at pg. 31-32 [hereinafter U.S. Chamber Report] (finding that policy changes by the
FCC that deregulates the telecommunications sector could lead to a growth in the U.S.
economy and jobs market.); see In re Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of
Licenses and Section 214 Authorizations from MediaOne Group, Inc., Transferor to AT&T
Corp., Transferee, CS Docket No. 99-251, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 15 FCC Rcd.
9816, para. 117 (2000) [hereinafter AT&T-MediaOne Merger Order] ("[R]egard[ing] choice
among broadband access providers, there is evidence that ILECs, CLECs, and other com-
petitive providers are aggressively rolling out alternative broadband technologies, notwith-
standing cable's early lead... ").
69 Advanced Telecommunications Report, supra note 1, at 10 (defining "advanced tele-
communications capability" and "advanced services" as "services and facilities with an
upstream (customer-to-provider) and downstream (provider-to-customer) transmission
speed of 200 kbps or greater." These facilities and services are referred by the FCC as
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it as the next Moses that will lead all who believes to a promised land-a land
where people communicate information quickly and inexpensively."0 Econo-
mists say "the future of the Internet is broadband."' The evolution of
advanced communications services largely depends on consumers accessing
broadband Intemet-a development that could also spur economic growth.72
As former FCC Chairman Michael Powell described it, "anybody who cares
about the [U.S.] economic well-being ... has begun to see the critical value of
investing in broadband infrastructure and information technologies."73
A recent independent study released by the United States Chamber of
Commerce concluded that an overhaul of telecommunications regulations
would encourage capital investment in new high-speed networks, reduce costs,
increase productivity and improve service quality for United States based
companies.74 The impact of deregulating the telecommunications industry
could result in a $634 billion increase in the Gross Domestic Product ("GDP")
and the creation of 212,000 new jobs over the next five years.75 Authored by
four economists, the study determined that policymakers could approach the
growth of broadband from two perspectives: either as a regulatory system that
creates uncertainty, or as a market-oriented approach that allows consumers,
investors, and innovators to determine the path to be taken. 76 The study found
United States telecommunications to be at a critical juncture and therefore
based on their findings, the economists championed a deregulatory path to
ubiquitous broadband deployment.7 Competition among American businesses
'broadband,' which includes various platforms such as wireline, cable, and licensed as well
as unlicensed wireless facilities.).
70 SHARON E. GILLETT ET AL., Local Government Broadband Initiative, 28 TELECOM-
MUNICATIONS POLICY 537, 537-38 (Doug Pitts ed., Elsevier Ltd (2004)) [hereinafter Local
Initiative].
71 Id. at 537.
72 Id.
73 Pulver, supra note 7, at 22.
74 U.S. Chamber Report, supra note 68, at xix, 85 (concluding that "[u]nder the pro-
posed [deregulatory] reforms, the telecommunications sector-now heavily burdened by
regulations, would return to growth." This conclusion would also be applicable to knowl-
edge-based industries such as technology, healthcare, and education which the study points
out "will drive U.S growth and... constitute the battleground in global outsourcing...").
75 Id. at 110. ("The total impact of the telecommunications reforms recommended in
this report is the sum of the demand effect of increased capital spending on network assets
plus the supply effect of increased productivity growth."). The authors project that the total
impact of deregulatory reforms on capital investment by the telecommunications sector
could mean an increase of $167 billion and another $467 billion in productivity growth for a
total increase to GDP over the next five years at $634 billion in additional goods and ser-
vices.) Id.
76 Id. at 111; see also, Advanced Telecommunications Report, supra note 1, at 46
("Government policymakers will be challenged to find innovative ways to support private
market mechanisms that will deploy and improve advanced services.").
77 U.S. Chamber Report, supra note 68, at 85.
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has increased exponentially, and will continue on an upward trend, because of
the rapid development of instantaneous communications."8 Investment in in-
formation technology since 1995 has resulted in the doubling of United States
workers' productivity growth.79 American telecommunications systems were
structured and limited not long ago, which meant "policymakers imposed
stringent regulations on the few companies that delivered narrowly defined
services."8 Communications technology evolved and converged into a single
form of telecommunications, through which previously separate technolo-
gies-wire, wireless, cable, satellite, and power utility lines-can now transmit
voice, data and video.8 These technologies compete with one another to de-
liver various services under this regime to consumers.82
D. Local Government Initiatives Sidestep Federal Regulation
A recent Harris Interactive Incorporated poll found that 156 million Ameri-
cans are online users either at home, in the office, or at other locations. 3 Out
of the 73% of adults on the Internet, 44% now use broadband.84 Nielsen/Net
78 Id. at 107; see also Advanced Telecommunications Report, supra note 1, at 44 ("The
continuing deployment of broadband and the development of services that rely upon broad-
band may thus have a synergistic, mutually reinforcing quality; deployment will likely spur
the development of services that, in turn, will spur further deployment.").
79 U.S. Chamber Report, supra note 68, at 107-08.
80 U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Summary of Findings, Sending the Right Signals: Pro-
moting Competition Through Telecommunications Reform, at 3 (Sept. 22, 2000)
(highlighting major points of the full report).
81 E.g., In re Amendment of Part 15 Regarding New Requirements and Measurement
Guidelines for Access Broadband Over Power Line Systems, Carrier Current Systems, in-
cluding Broadband over Power Line Systems, Report and Order, 19 FCC Rcd. 21265,
paras. 1, 5 (2004) [hereinafter BPL Report and Order] (concluding that Broadband over
Power Line ("BPL") could serve as an additional broadband delivery platform, providing
"an effective means for "last-mile" delivery of broadband services and may offer a competi-
tive alternative to digital subscriber line (DSL), cable modem services and other high speed
Internet access technologies."); see also Joint Statement on Broadband Over Power Line
Communications Services by Chairman Pat Wood, III, FERC and Chairman Michael K.
Powell of the FCC, FCC News, Oct. 1, 2004, at I ("[T]he provision of high-speed commu-
nications capabilities over utility poles and electric power lines (Access BPL) provides an
opportunity to increase the competitive broadband choices that are available to customers
and the power supply system management options of utilities.").
82 Shawn Young, All in One: Buying Bundles of Telecom Services Can Make Things
Easier-and Cheaper-for Consumers, WALL ST. J., Sept. 13, 2004, at R6; see also Walter
S. Mossberg, Watching TV on Your Cellphone, WALL ST. J., Jul. 1, 2004, at D7 ("Not
enough TV in your life? Well, now you can stay tuned.., thanks to your cellphone ...
While the idea of watching TV on a wireless phone is new in the U.S., it's old hat in some
other countries.").
83 Lawrence Rout, Broadband: Online Audience Grows-from Different Directions,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 13, 2004, at R2.
84 Id.
[Vol. 13
Speaking With One Broadband Voice
Ratings research from July 2004 found that "[t]he percentage of U.S. Internet
users connecting from home using broadband surpassed the percentage that use
narrowband connection" or dial-up. 5 Presently, 63 million people surf the
Web through broadband, compared to 61.3 million using dial-up services.
Broadband connections from the home accounted for 51% of Internet users in
July 2004, compared with 38% of home Internet broadband users in the previ-
ous year. 86
Although the FCC found in the Advanced Communications Report that sub-
scription to high-speed services were reported in 93% of all U.S. zip codes, v
many local governments are not waiting for the private sector or federally im-
posed mandates to get their community wired. 8 Local government policymak-
ers have looked at various initiatives to provide advanced communications ser-
vices to their community. 9 Proposed ideas to stimulate demand for local
broadband services include local governments: (1) playing the role of buyer,
facilitator, or lead user; (2) adopting policy reforms that reduce cost and time
constraints required for private-sector deployments; (3) being used as a finan-
cial incentive source to stimulate broadband; and (4) stimulating broadband
deployment by developing their own municipal infrastructure network.9" Im-
plementation of these ideas would result in availability, choice, quality, and
lower pricing.9'
Danville, Virginia is one example of a local government using all four initia-
tives with promising and successful results.92 As USA Today reported, the
town of 48,000 people had lost 7,500 textile jobs to modernization and off-
shore cheap labor.93 Another community economic anchor - tobacco - had
also suffered market losses. Both economic downturns resulted in few jobs:
That's when Danville decided to grab fate by the throat. The result: Danville, a high-
85 Vauhini Vara, High Speed Surpass Dial-Up As Top Home Web Access in U.S., WALL
ST. J., Aug. 18, 2004 at D4.
86 Id. (stating that one reason for an increase in consumer use of high speed broadband
services over dial-up can be attributed to popular applications that require a faster Internet
pipeline, such as interactive videogames and music streaming. The author suggests that it is
the commercial use of the broadband application, not government forced regulation that is
helping to "clos[e] the gap with other countries where broadband usage is high."). Cf Ad-
vanced Telecommunications Report, supra note 1, at 43, 44 ("Government support is also a
driver of broadband development. In [South Korea, and Canada-which lead the world in
broadband penetration levels, as well as Japan, and the U.S.] the government provides some
form of support for broadband service.").
87 Advanced Telecommunications Report, supra note 1, at 30.
88 See Local Initiative, supra note 70, at 539.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 540-48.
91 Id. at 557.
92 Leslie Cauley, Small Towns Tired of Slow Rollout Create Own High-Speed Networks,
USA TODAY, Sept. 22, 2004, at B I.
93 Id.
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octane, business-class fiber-optic network capable of delivering voice, data, and video
services. The system is being built in phases with help from World Wide Packets, a
company that specializes in municipal networks. The state-of-the-art workhorse offers
speeds up to 1 gigabit in both directions . . . 'We used to have to beg business to locate
here. Now our phones are ringing off the hook,' Mayor Tom Hamline says.94
Although local governments providing advanced telecommunications ser-
vices may be a new phenomenon, more towns across America are building
their own networks out of frustration over sluggish broadband rollout.95 The
success of these projects is due in part to little regulation.
III. MULTIPLE CIRCUIT COURTS ATTEMPT TO DEFINE CABLE
MODEM SERVICE
Traditionally, cable television services provided one-way video program-
ming from network to subscriber.96 Prior to the 1996 Act, cable operators had
begun to transmit conventional video programming to subscribers, as well as
non-video communications (or data transmissions) to school districts, fire de-
partments, police stations, and libraries using coaxial and fiber optic cables.97
Despite some sporadic expansion of two-way communications services, cable
entities providing broadband services remained relatively new until passage of
the 1996 Act.98 Although cable systems typically have been municipally fran-
chised, there has existed a coordination of federal, state, and local authority.99
Under the 1996 Act, local governments, for example, can regulate cable ser-
vices up to a point. Congress specifically recognizes the power of local fran-
chising authorities to preserve competition for cable services"' or to exercise
94 Id.
95 See Local Initiative, supra note 70, at 538-39.
96 Cable Declaratory Ruling, supra note 15, at para. 12; see also Brief of Intervenors
WorldCom, Inc. et al. at 3, Brand X Internet Servs. v. FCC 345 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2003),
cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 655 (2004).
97 Tex. Utilities Elec. Co. v FCC, 997 F.2d 925, 927-28 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (holding FCC
interpretation of the Pole Attachment Act, passed by Congress authorizing the FCC to regu-
late rates assessed by utilities for any attachment by a cable television system to their poles,
included commingled services. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
found the FCC interpretation of an ambiguous provision of the Pole Attachment Act subject
to its authority reasonably interpreted the statute); see 47 U.S.C. §224(a)-(b) (2000); see
also Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n, Inc. v. Gulf Power, 534 U.S. 327, 330 (2002) (finding
the FCC continued to have jurisdiction to regulate the rates, terms, and conditions for pole
attachments).
98 Local Initiative, supra note 70, at 537.
99 AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 43 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1152 (D. Or. 1999) (finding
prior to the FCC asserting jurisdiction over cable broadcasting in the mid-1960s, local gov-
ernments had been regulating cable companies) rev 'd on other grounds, 216 F.3d 871 (9th
Cir. 2000); see also Midland Telecasting Co. v. Midessa Television Co. 617 F.2d 1141,
1146 (5th Cir. 1980).
100 47 U.S.C. §533(d)(2) (2000) ("Any State or franchising authority may not prohibit
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authority over matters regarding public health, safety, and welfare.' ' But the
extent of power a local franchise authority would have on cable modem service
providers would depend on whether such service can be defined as cable, tele-
communications, or information service. '2 The FCC launched a notice of in-
quiry beginning in 1998 on the type of regulatory treatment cable modem ser-
vices merited under the Act, °3 and the issue continued to arise under various
proceedings, including one complaint from an Internet Service Provider
("ISP")0 4 and several license transfers involving cable mergers.0 5
the ownership of control of a cable system by any person ... Nothing in this section shall be
construed to prevent any State or franchising authority from prohibiting the ownership or
control of a cable system in a jurisdiction by any person ... (2) in circumstances in which
the State or franchising authority determines that the acquisition of such a cable system may
eliminate or reduce competition in the delivery of cable service in such jurisdiction.") (em-
phasis added).
101 47 U.S.C §556(a) (2000) (stating that it must be consistent with the express provi-
sions of this title); see also 47 U.S.C. §556(c) (2000) (stating that "except as provided in
section 557, any provisions of law of any State, political subdivision, or agency thereof, or
franchising authority, or any provision of any franchise granted by such authority, which is
inconsistent with this Act shall be deemed to be preempted and superseded.").
102 See Wireline Broadband NPRM supra note 10, at para. 4 ("Current networks and
technologies that enable the end-user to engage in broadband capabilities are evolving and
that the infrastructure of today may be insufficient to support the applications of tomorrow.
Therefore, the Commission should avoid policies that have the unintended consequence of
embracing too quickly any one technology or service.").
103 See Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capabil-
ity to All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps To Accelerate
Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Notice
of Inquiry, 13 FCC Rcd. 15280, paras. 77-82 (1998) [hereinafter Advanced Telecommunica-
tions NOI]; see also Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications
Capability to All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps To
Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of
1996, Report to Congress [hereinafter First 706 Report], 14 FCC Rcd. 2398, paras. 100-01
(1999) ("We note, as a preliminary matter, that our duty to encourage broadband deploy-
ment of advanced services requires us to look broadly at all methods of providing additional
bandwidth to customers, not just those methods provided by cable companies or other par-
ticular types of service providers."). Although the FCC acknowledged a sparse record at
that time, the First 706 Report found consumers would soon have a broad range of broad-
band choices, thanks to immerging technologies. The Commission felt at that time, argua-
bly correct, that based on projected innovative broadband deployment, there was no reason
to impose heavy regulation.
104 See In re Internet Ventures, Inc., Internet On-Ramp, Inc., Petition for Declaratory
Ruling that Internet Service Providers are Entitled to Leased Access to Cable Facilities Un-
der Section 612 of the Communications Act, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 15 FCC
Rcd. 3247 (2000) [hereinafter Internet Ventures] (seeking FCC ruling that ISPs were enti-
tled to leased commercial access under Section 612 because ISPs such as Internet Ventures
were providers of video programming). The FCC did not address issues raised by filed
comments such as "mandatory ISP access to cable operators' broadband facilities, and
whether Internet access provided by a cable system constitutes 'cable service,' 'telecommu-
nications,' or an information service'." Id. at para. 11. Rather, it narrowly addressed the
threshold issue raised by the petition: "does ISP Internet access service, such as that pro-
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Despite a congressional mandate to deploy advanced telecommunications
capability on a reasonable and timely basis under the 1996 Act, the FCC, by its
own admission, dragged its feet for several years, refusing to "determine a
regulatory classification for, or to regulate cable modem service on an indus-
try-wide basis."'" The FCC's inaction gave several federal courts the opportu-
nity to regulate national communication policy." 7 This type of multi-district
litigation resulted in regulatory uncertainty.
vided by [petitioner] constitute video programming contemplated under Section 612 of the
Act?" Id. at para. 12.
105 See In re Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses and Section
214 Authorizations by Time Warner Inc. and America Online, Inc. Transferors, to AOL
Time Warner Inc., Transferee, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 16 FCC Rcd. 6547 (2001)
[hereinafter AOL Time Warner Merger]. The Applicants argued that the FCC should not
impose open-access conditions to the cable pipeline for independent ISPs wanting to pro-
vide alternative Internet service because "this case is indistinguishable from prior cases such
as AT&T-MediaOne in which the Commission declined to require AT&T to open its cable
networks to unaffiliated ISPs." Id. at para. 53. The Applicants tried to make the case that
imposing an access condition in the AOL Time Warner Merger would be "inconsistent with
the Commission's pending Notice of Inquiry on high-speed Internet access." Id; see also
Cable Access NOI, infra note 257. AOL's argument fell on deaf ears. The FCC pointed out
that AOL "had been the leading advocate and supporter of the 'open access' movement" and
the combination of AOL purchasing Time Warner, as the second largest cable system, could
give it an "ability to discriminate against unaffiliated ISPs." AOL Time Warner Merger,
supra note 105, at paras. 54, 87. The Commission reminded the Applicants that previous
mergers "involved a comparable combination of assets or a comparable potential impact on
competition among broadband ISPs." Id. at para. 55. Additionally, the FCC pointed out the
Cable Access NOI dealt with issues affecting the whole industry, while the AOL-Time
Warner merger would place the new company "in a unique position that may justify condi-
tions inapplicable to other." Id. at para. 55; see also AT&T-MediaOne Merger, supra note
68. During the AT&T-MediaOne merger review, AT&T made several open-access com-
mitments to the FCC granting unaffiliated ISPs a pipeline to the merged companies' cable
modem platform. Id. at para. 121 ("AT&T and MediaOne have also agreed to negotiate,
upon the expiration of their exclusive arrangement with Excite @ Home and Road Runner,
private contracts with multiple ISPs in order to offer those ISPs reasonably comparable
access prices.").
106 Cable Declaratory Ruling, supra note 15, at para. 2. Although Congress mandated a
policy for a ubiquitous broadband deployment, the FCC conducted several inquires and
rulings, yet the Commission could not arrive at a policy determination until 2002. See supra
notes 48, 56, 68, & 103-105 and accompanying text; see also Nat'l Cable & Telecomm.
Ass'n, Inc. v Gulf Power, 534 U.S. 327, 351-53 (2002) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("The FCC
has not represented to this Court that high-speed Internet access provided through cable
wires is not a telecommunications service. To the contrary, it has made its agnosticism on
the topic quite clear.").
107 See Lake and Brill, supra note 28, at 8.
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A. Establishing Cable Modem Broadband Policy Before the FCC Reaches a
Conclusion
1. District Court Ruling Under AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland
The FCC's legal setbacks in setting a national broadband policy trace back
to AT&T's 1999 acquisition of Telecommunications Inc. ("TCI")."°8 The long
distance telephone giant aspired to offer consumers local phone service over
cable lines using the high-speed Internet platform. Most telecommunications
industry analysts concluded a merger between the two companies would "be
the first serious competition for regional Bell phone companies."'' 9 In order to
establish itself as a broadband powerhouse, AT&T began to acquire interest in
the cable industry. ' In the summer of 1998, AT&T and TCI announced their
intent to forge ahead with the "the ultimate deal."''. The merged companies
sought approval from three regulatory entities-the Department of Justice
("DOJ"), the FCC, and local governments. Both the DOJ and the FCC com-
pleted a review of the merger and approved it. The DOJ gave its antitrust
blessings to the deal once TCI sold its wireless business interest in Sprint
PCS."2 The Commission in turn, analyzed the AT&T proposed transfer of
licenses and authorizations controlled by TCI under the standard public interest
review, balancing the concerns raised by interested parties such as residential
Internet access with the potential consumer benefits."3 Once it completed its
review of TCI's federal license transfers to AT&T, the FCC concluded the re-
cord did not support any requests by ISPs to impose open access or forced ac-
cess requirements upon AT&T."4
108 Mike McDaniel, AT&T, TCI Agree to Bold Buyout Plan, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, June
25, 1998, at AI ("Bypassing local-phone wires, AT&T's challenge to the Baby Bell regional
companies points to a future in technology that could eventually converge conventional
phones, televisions and Internet services.").
109 Id.
110 Steve Rosenbush et al., AT&T to Purchase TCI $30 Billion Deal Will Upend Phone,
Cable Industries, USA TODAY, June 24, 1998, at Al. One of the major investment prob-
lems AT&T would face in buying a company like TCI would be to overhaul the cable op-
erations system that support two-way traffic, requiring a financial commitment to expand
the broadband infrastructure.
"I d. (quoting Brian Roberts, CEO of cable company Comcast). One of the reasons
why this $30 billion merger made so much business sense was TCI's major interest in the
@Home Internet service for cable modems.
112 AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2000); see United States
v. AT&T Corp., Telecomm. Inc. No. CIV. 98 C003170, 1999 WL 1211462 (D.D.C. 1999)
(final judgment).
113 See In re Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Licenses and Section 214 Au-
thorizations from TCI to AT&T, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 14 FCC Rcd. 3160, para
1. (1999) [hereinafter, AT&T-TCI Merger].
114 Id. at paras. 94-96.
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Officials from the City of Portland held public hearings in the fall of 1998 to
discuss the regulatory treatment of cable modem services in light of the pro-
posed AT&T/TCI merger."5 Several parties argued to the regulatory commis-
sion advising city officials, that the AT&T/TCI merger would have a detrimen-
tal effect on local cable services by monopolizing "the local retail market for
residential Internet access services.""' 6 Portland arrived at two conclusions:
(1) AT&T's cable modem platform "had no viable competitors in the local
retail market for residential Internet access service" and (2) the city should
regulate AT&T's broadband service "as an 'essential facility' to protect com-
petition.""' 7
The Portland officials believed that "[s]o long as cable modem services are
deemed by law to be 'cable services' as provided under Title VI of the Com-
115 AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 43 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1150 (D. Or. 1999), rev'd, 216
F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2000).
116 Id. at 1150. Unaffiliated Internet Service Providers argued that the merger would
give cable subscribers limited choices in Internet services. ISPs claimed that without access
to the cable system pipeline, they couldn't compete with AT&T's @Home cable modem
platform and therefore "would be driven out of business, eliminating several hundred jobs,
and costing the local economy $20 million." AT&T Corp., 43 F. Supp. 2d at 1150. Neither
the regulatory commission, city officials, nor the district court gave ample evidence for such
a dramatic conclusion. This consumer welfare concern was raised by US West, the incum-
bent local telephone exchange carrier who stood to lose its customer base if AT&T began
offering voice services. Of course, the "economic injury" testimony was an onerous legal
finding by the Portland city officials because the Department of Justice had approved the
merger on an antitrust ground; see AT&T Corp., TCI, Inc., 1999 WL 1211462, at 7. As the
Appeals Court later asserted, there are other ways for consumers to get high-speed Internet
access in the home, such as digital subscriber lines ("DSL"), fixed wireless providers, and
satellite providers. City of Portland, 216 F.3d at 874.
"17 AT&T Corp., 43 F. Supp. 2d at 1150. An "essential facility" is an antitrust term
which means a facility that competitors cannot practically duplicate and that otherwise is
unavailable because the "monopolist" refuses to make the facility available to another party.
See generally Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
This type of refusal may violate antitrust laws because a monopolist's control over an essen-
tial facility (called a "bottleneck") can extend from one stage of production to another, and
from one market into another. Compare Otter Tail Power Co. v. U.S., 410 U.S. 366, 377
(1973) ("The record makes abundantly clear that Otter Tail used its monopoly power in the
towns in its service area to foreclose competition or gain a competitive advantage, or to
destroy a competitor, all in violation of the antitrust laws.") with Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen
Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985) (Although plaintiff won at trial arguing his
case under essential facilities, the High Court did not rely on the "essential facilities" doc-
trine to affirm jury's conclusion.). See also Verizon Comm. Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V.
Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 411 (2004) ("We have never recognized such a doctrine and we
find no need to either recognize it or to repudiate it here."). Although the Court did not
apply the essential facilities doctrine in Verizon, it took notice that for anyone to invoke
such doctrine, an "indispensable requirement" element would be needed for a litigant to
argue "the unavailability of access to the 'essential facilities'; where access exists, the doc-
trine services no purpose." Id. The Court pointed out that such claims cannot be made
when a federal agency, such as the FCC, has jurisdiction to regulate and compel open ac-
cess. Id.
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munications Act of 1934," cable modem services could be regulated under its
jurisdiction." 8 It should be noted that the Communications Act is ambiguous
when it comes to the regulatory scheme of cable modem services. Despite this
onerous classification, the Portland city officials conditioned the merger on
open-access to independent Internet Service Providers (ISP's)." 9 Portland ar-
gued to the district court that cable modem regulation should be classified un-
der Title VI as a cable service, having therefore full authority and jurisdiction
to mandate such conditions on AT&T/TCI's license and franchise agreement
transfers.20
In the meantime, AT&T did not argue cable modem broadband services
should be regulated under the deregulatory Title I information service rather
than under Title VI regulatory cable services. Instead, the company argued
federal preemption under the Communications Act.'2' The District Court read
the law incorrectly because instead of writing in its opinion "which is inconsis-
tent with this Act" found in the statute, it read 47 U.S.C. §556 to say "which is
inconsistent with this chapter."'22 In its analysis, the court found that Congress
"intended to interfere as little as possible with existing local government au-
thority to regulate cable franchises" and that "courts had long recognized a
city's power to promote competition in the local economy. '  The court stated
that if Congress wanted to preempt the authority of a local franchise over ca-
ble, "[it] must make its intent 'unmistakably clear' in the statute's wording. '"24
Perhaps the court should have read the statute more closely since Congress
118 AT&TCorp., 43 F. Supp. 2d at 1150.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 1150.
121 Id. at 1151. See 47 U.S.C. §556(c) (2000) ("Any provision of law of any State, po-
litical subdivision, or agency thereof, or franchising authority, or any provision of any fran-
chise granted by such authority, which is inconsistent with this Act, shall be deemed to be
preempted and superseded.").
122 AT&T v. City of Portland, 43 F. Supp. 2d at 1151 (emphasis added). If the District
Court had read the statute correctly, it would have to read the entire Act, finding the City's
"[o]rdinance is preempted by several provisions of Title VI of the Communications Act,
which was enacted among other reasons, 'to establish a national policy concerning cable
communications' and to ' . . . minimize unnecessary regulation that would impose an undue
economic burden on cable systems"' under 47 U.S.C §§521(l), (6). MediaOne Group Inc.
v. County of Henrico, 97 F. Supp. 2d 712, 714 (E.D. Va. 2000), aff'd 257 F.3d 356 (4th Cir.
2001). Congress's telecommunications policy was intended to create a communications
environment "that preserves the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for
the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regula-
tion" under 47 U.S.C. §230(b)(2) (emphasis added). Id. quoting 47 U.S.C. §230(b)(2)
(2000). It is worth noting that the district court relied on Barbara Esbin, supra note 50, to
inform itself on the benefits that cable modem broadband holds for both consumers and the
communication industry. See AT&T v. City of Portland, 43 F. Supp. 2d at 1149-50.
123 AT&Tv. City of Portland, 43 F. Supp. 2d at 1151-52.
124 Id. at 1152.
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explicitly preempted municipalities under §556(c) from exerting franchise au-
thority if their actions were inconsistent with the Communications Act. The
district court granted summary judgment to the City of Portland, giving it the
authority to condition the transfer of control of TCI's cable licenses to AT&T
upon the company opening its Internet cable facilities to competing ISPs.12 5
2. Ninth Circuit Ruling in AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland
AT&T appealed the case to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit challenging the City of Portland's authority to condition the transfer of
federal licenses upon opening its cable modem platform to unaffiliated ISPs.'26
The question before the court was straightforward: "whether a local cable fran-
chising authority may condition a transfer of a cable franchise upon the cable
operator's grant of unrestricted access to its cable broadband transmission fa-
cilities for Internet service providers other than the operator's proprietary ser-
vice.'27 The Commission, authorized by Congress to develop national com-
munications policy, filed an amicus curiae brief addressing the various issues
raised by the parties in the district court: 1) why the FCC did not condition the
AT&T-TCI merger by imposing an open access requirement after evaluating
the competing arguments and 2) why the Commission may preempt local gov-
ernment regulation that conflicts with federal policy such as an open access
requirement on broadband over cable systems. 28
The FCC gave the Ninth Circuit panel a brief tutorial on the merits behind
regulatory restraint over computer data services.'29 The Commission's brief
described to the court how Congress intended the FCC to make advanced ser-
vices available to all Americans through regulatory forbearance over Internet
broadband. 3 ° The court was given sufficient analysis on how the FCC deter-
mined Congress' goal of widespread broadband deployment thus far and why
regulatory intervention in the high-speed Internet service market was not nec-
essary. 3' As to the merits of the case, the Commission pointed out the fact that
it had approved the AT&T-TCI merger without imposing any open access re-
125 Id. at 1156.
126 AT&T v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2000).
127 Id. at 872.
128 Brief Amicus Curiae Federal Communications Commission at 11-15, 16, 27, AT&T
v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2000) (No. 99-35609) [hereinafter FCC Arnicus
Curiae].
129 Id. at 3.
130 Id. at 5.
131 Id. at 8-9 (stating several parties had advocated for open access requirements, but the
record compiled by the First 706 Report indicated a market-oriented approach encouraging
multiple broadband platforms would served consumers best); see First 706 Report, supra
note 103, at 101.
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quirements based on the record compiled during the merger process.'32 Just as
AT&T had argued before a trial judge, the Commission gave the Ninth Circuit
its analysis on local franchising authorities imposing open access requirements
of cable companies.'33 The FCC tried to correct the trial record by stating that
the litigants below had "premised their arguments in this case on [the] faulty
legal assumption," that cable broadband was regulated as a cable service.'34
The FCC agreed that Congress was vague on its regulatory intent for broad-
band services over cable and the Commission had yet to resolve the matter."' 35
The Commission reminded the court that Congress authorized an adminis-
trative agency experienced in telecommunications policy with the sole "re-
sponsibility for the monitoring and advancement of national broadband pol-
icy." '136 The FCC argued that it alone had "jurisdiction over all of the current
providers of broadband technology [while] [l]ocal franchising authorities, in
contrast, are in no position to implement technologically-neutral policies with
respect to all these competitors."'37 The FCC pleaded with the court for "a nar-
row judicial resolution of the dispute.' 38
The court's opinion started off with boilerplate concerns, such as "this is a
struggle over access to cable broadband technology .. ." and stating that sev-
eral parties to the case "forcefully urge us to consider what our national policy
should be concerning open access to the Internet. However, that is not our
task, and in our quicksilver technological environment it doubtless would be an
idle exercise.' '139 The analysis began by considering whether the AT&T cable
broadband platform Excite@Home was a "cable service" as defined by Con-
gress in the 1996 Act. 40 Under the court's statutory interpretation, it was not.
132 FCC Amicus Curiae, supra note 128, at 13-15.
133 Id. at 19.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 19, 26 ("To date, the [FCC] has not decided whether broadband capability
offered over cable facilities is a 'cable service' ... or instead should be classified as 'tele-
communications' or as an 'information service.' The answer to this question is far from
clear."); see also AT&T v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 876 (9th Cir. 2000).
136 FCC Amicus Curiae, supra note 128, at 13-15.
137 Id. at 29 ("In the absence of express statutory preemption, the FCC may preempt
local cable regulation that conflict with federal policy, so long as the Commission acts,
'within the scope of its congressionally delegated authority."') (quoting City of New York
v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57 (1988)).
138 FCC Amicus Curiae, supra note 128, at 29, 30 ("Ultimately, given the rapidly evolv-
ing technologies involved here, the Court should proceed with caution when it resolved this
case.").
139 City of Portland, 216 F.3d at 873, 876.
140 Id. at 876 ("Like Heraclitus at the river, we address the Internet aware that courts are
ill-suited to fix its flow; instead, we draw our bearings from the legal landscape, and chart a
course by the law's words."). It's not clear whether the court attempted to reach a conclu-
sion based on the metaphysical aspect of the law, something Heraclitus might have argued
for as a 21 st century litigant. But, the court did state that it would look to the plain language
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Cable service was a one-way transmission of programming to subscribers,
while Internet access involves two-way information exchange beyond sub-
scriber interaction. 4' The court stated that the 1996 Act does not allow a ca-
ble company to operate without local government franchise authority, but cable
modem services provided by AT&T are not cable services, and therefore Port-
land may not directly regulate them through its franchise authority.'42
The case should have been over and done with at that point because the is-
sues raised at trial had been addressed with a narrow judicial resolution. After
all, the FCC had reviewed the merger and the court concluded Portland had no
cable service franchise authority.'43 However, due to the Ninth Circuit's pro-
pensity for playing both judicial and legislative roles, and the absence of an
FCC explicit position regarding the regulatory classification of high-speed
Internet services, the court adopted its own broadband policy. The court de-
clared that "although we conclude that a cable operator may provide cable
broadband Internet access without a cable service franchise, we must deter-
mine whether Portland may condition AT&T's provision of standard cable
service upon its opening access to the cable broadband network for competing
ISPs.",
of the entire Communications Act, "including obiect and policy." Id. It appears the Ninth
Circuit Court may have proved Heraclitus' philosophy to be correct, since they were briefed
by the FCC on the obiect and policy of the 1996 Act, yet they refused to give deference.
See id ("We note at the outset that the FCC has declined, both in its regulatory capacity and
as amicus curiae, to address the issue before us."). But see supra text accompanying notes
128-138. Compare with James Fieser, Ph.D, Heraclitus: The Internet Encyclopedia of Phi-
losophy, University of Tennessee at Martin, at http://www.luc.edu/fa-
culty/meppers/courses/192 Science ReligionSociety/documents/04_Heraclitus.pdf (Mar.
31, 2005) (quoting Heraclitus as saying "men always prove to be uncomprehending, both
before they have heard it and when once they have heard it.").
141 AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 876 (9th Cir. 2000).
The Act defines 'cable service' as '(A) the one-way transmission to subscribers of (i)
video programming, or )ii) other programming service, and (B) subscriber interaction,
if any, which is required for the selection or use of such video programming or other
programming service.' 47 U.S.C. §522(6). For the purposes of this definition, 'video
programming' means 'programming provided by, or generally considered comparable
to programming provided by, a television broadcast station,' 47 U.S.C. §522(20), and
'other programming service' means 'information that a cable operator makes available
to all subscribers generally,' 47 U.S.C. §522(14). The essence of cable service, there-
fore, is one-way transmission of programming to subscribers generally.
Id. The court also concluded that "applying carefully tailored scheme of cable television
regulation to cable broadband would lead to an absurd result." Id. at 877. It is worth noting
that the Ninth Circuit credited the expertise analysis of this conclusion to the Circuit Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia. See NCTA v. FCC, 33 F.3d 66 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
This supports the argument that the D.C. Circuit is seen among other courts as an expert in
telecommunications law and policy.
142 City of Portland, 216 F.3d at 877; see also 47 U.S.C. §541(b)(1) (2000).
143 City of Portland, 216 F.3d at 879
144 Id. at 877.
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The three-judge panel took it upon itself to determine the regulatory scheme
of broadband over cable within the context of the 1996 Act, despite the fact
that neither Congress not the FCC had done so."' The Ninth Circuit held that
cable modem service was a hybrid formulation-partly an information service
and partly a telecommunications service. 4 6 Because the Act prohibits local
governments from regulating telecommunications service, "Portland may not
condition the transfer of the cable franchise on nondiscriminatory access to
AT&T's cable broadband network."'47 The court completely disregarded pre-
vious findings by the FCC when it concluded that the definition of "informa-
tion service" and "telecommunications service" under the Telecommunications
Act of 1996 established mutually exclusive categories of service "when an en-
tity offers transmission incorporating the 'capability for generating, acquiring,
storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available
information,' . . . it offers an 'information service' even though it uses tele-
communications to do so.""' Although several parties to this case "hailed the
decision," this holding was a time bomb waiting to explode.'49
B. Any Authority Inconsistent With the Communications Act Shall be
Deemed Preempted
1. District Court Findings in MediaOne Group and AT&T Corp. v. County of
Henrico
Nearly a year after the United States District Court for the District of Ore-
gon decided that federal preemption under the Communications Act would not
prevent Portland from regulating cable modem broadband as a cable service,
the same issue and the same plaintiff litigant came before the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.' Just like its acquisition of
TCI Cable, AT&T continued its cable industry shopping spree in 1999, spend-
145 Id.
146 Id. at 878.
147 Id. at 880 ("We hold that subsection 541(b)(3) prohibits a franchising authority from
regulating cable broadband Internet access, because the transmission of Internet service to
subscribers over cable broadband facilities is a telecommunications service under the Com-
munications Act.").
148 Universal Service Report, supra note 56, at para. 39; see also Non-Accounting Safe-
guards Remand, supra note 48, at para. 36.
149 Reed Business Information, DO] Wants Freedom for Broadband, at
www.americasnetwork.com/americasnetwork/article/articleDetail.jsp?id=121627 (Sept. 9,
2004).
150 See generally MediaOne Group, Inc. v. County of Henrico, 97 F. Supp. 2d 712 (E.D.
Va. 2000), aff'd, 257 F.3d 356 (4th Cir. 2001).
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ing $58 billion to buy MediaOne Group, Inc.' In May, AT&T and MediaOne
agreed to merge, giving the phone giant control of additional cable assets, in-
cluding MediaOne's cable system in Henrico County, Virginia.'52 Similar to
the interests involved in the TCI buyout, MediaOne Group, Inc. provided tradi-
tional cable services along with an upgraded cable modem platform and a stake
in Road Runner, once a provider of Internet access over cable. "3 The company
provided bundled high-speed Internet access using MediaOne's broadband
pipelines with Internet connectivity traditionally served by unaffiliated ISPs.'54
AT&T filed an application with the Henrico County Board of Supervisors
seeking to transfer MediaOne's cable carriage rights.'55 Once again, the county
held public meetings and hearings, concluding a transfer of control could take
place under one condition: that the merged company "provides any requesting
Internet Service Provider access to its cable modem platform (unbundled from
the provision of content)" at wholesale rates. 56 If AT&T did not meet the re-
151 Rebecca Blumenstein & John R. Wilke, AT&T Deal for MediaOne Moves Ahead,
WALL ST. J., May 26, 2000, at A3.
152 Id.; cf MediaOne Group, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 713 (pointing out that "MediaOne's cable
system in Henrico includes a 'cable modem platform' which can be used to provide high-
speed, two-way connection to the Internet ... [a] cable modem platform [that] has an 'al-
ways on' connection that allows users such benefits as . . . information without first dialing
up.").
153 AT&T: What Victory Means, Bus. WEEK, May 17, 1999, at 34. MediaOne was in-
volved in several partnerships, which included a significant interest in Road Runner. AT&T
inherited from MediaOne a 25% interest in Time Warner Entertainment ("TWE"), a sub-
sidiary of Time Warner ("TW"). MediaOne's interest included most of TW's cable system.
Along with a partnership in cable systems, Time Warner had 40% co-controlling interest in
Road Runner.
154 Kent Morlan, MediaOne Group v. County of Henrico, Virginia, MoreLaw.com, at
http://www.morelaw.com/verdicts/case.asp?n=00-1680,+00-1709,+00-
1719&s=VA&d=15277 (July 11, 2001). Unlike its merger with TCI, AT&T/MediaOne
faced a tougher sell to the federal regulators. AT&T had to sell its interest in other cable
systems, but concerns were raised about AT&T stake in both Road Runner and Ex-
cite@Home Corp. ("@Home"). Both Internet providers were major rivals, and the govern-
ment worried "the combination could have stifled competition in the emerging market" for
Internet access over cable line. See Blumenstein & Wilke, supra note 151, at A3. The FCC
required AT&T to select one of three video condition compliance options consisting of(a) a
divesture in TWE interest, (b) terminating "its involvement in TWE's video programming
activities," or (c) divesting its interest in other cable systems. In re Applications for Con-
sent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses and Section 214 Authorizations from MediaOne
Group, Inc., Transferor, To AT&T Corp., Transferee, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 15
FCC Rcd. 9816, at para. 4 (2000) [hereinafter AT&T-MediaOne Merger Order]. The Jus-
tice Department, however, did not require AT&T to get rid of its interest in Road Runner
until 2002 due to a business partnership agreement. See United States v. AT&T Corp., and
MediaOne Group, Inc., No. CIV. A. I:00CV01 176 RLC, 2000 WL 1752108, at *3 (D.D.C.
Sept. 27, 2000) (final judgment).
155 MediaOne Group, Inc. v. County of Henrico, 97 F. Supp. 2d 712, 713 (E.D. Va.
2000).
156 Id. at 714.
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quirement within a year, the transfer of control would be denied.'57
AT&T and MediaOne asked the court to permanently enjoin Henrico
County from enforcing its ordinance, arguing federal law preempted Henrico's
local authority. 5 The district court held Title VI of the Communications Act
preempted the County's Board of Supervisors from requiring unlawful condi-
tions on the transfer request.'59 First, the court noted that Congress enacted
several provisions under Title VI "to establish a national policy concerning
cable communications [that] minimize unnecessary regulation that would im-
pose an undue economic burden on cable systems."' 60 As previously stated,
Congress explicitly passed the 1996 Act with the intent "to preserve the vibrant
and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other in-
teractive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation.""'
Applying a two-prong approach to its preemption analysis, the court asked
whether the ordinary meaning of the Communications Act accurately expresses
the legislative purpose. 62 The court answered in the affirmative because 47
U.S.C §556(c) made it clear that any state or local law "inconsistent with this
Act shall be deemed to be preempted and superseded."' 63  The court then
looked at the 1996 Act and found Henrico County's franchise authority incon-
sistent with four separate provisions and therefore the Communications Act
preempted the Board from regulating cable modem services and requiring open
access.
6
4
It is interesting to note the court's hesitancy to find any kind of definition for
157 Id.
158 Id. at 713.
159 Id. at 714.
160 County of Henrico, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 714; see also 47 U.S.C. §§521(1), (6) (2000).
161 47 U.S.C. §230(b)(2) (2000).
162 County of Henrico, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 714 (quoting FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S.
52, 57 (1990) (stating that the court looks at statutory intent in deciding whether state or
local authority is preempted by Congress.); see Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. 504
U.S. 374, 383 (1992).
163 County of Henrico, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 714 (emphasis added). Recall the District Court
in Oregon read the same statute differently and inaccurately, finding any provision of State
or Local authority providing "any franchise granted by such authority which is inconsistent
with this chapter shall be deemed to be preempted..." and concluding the City of Portland
was not preempted from placing open access requirement on AT&T's broadband service.
See AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 43 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1151 (D. Or. 1999).
164 County of Henrico, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 714. For example, under 47 U.S.C.
§541(b)(3)(D), local governments cannot require cable operators to provide telecommunica-
tions service or facilities as a condition of a franchise transfer, and the court found that the
county required such a service from MediaOne when it imposed access to its cable modem
platform facility "unbundled from the provision of content" to any requesting ISPs which
they also provide. Id. Such a demand would mean MediaOne would have to provide a
facility that provides a requesting ISP the means to send content between its customers.
This would be a violation of the Communications Act. Id.
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phrases or regulatory schemes merited to cable modem services. For example,
under 47 U.S.C §544(e), the statute uses the phrase "any transmission technol-
ogy."'65 The district court, however, said that "although the exact technology
required [to provide open access to multiple ISPs] cannot be determined from
the record," Henrico could not require MediaOne "to use some kind of multi-
ple access technology and equipment" that would allow ISPs to access the ca-
ble modem platform.'66 Although the court found that MediaOne's Road Run-
ner service merited a statutory definition of "cable service," such service that
provides one way video programming transmission or subscriber interaction
cannot be regulated by local government under 47 U.S.C. §541(c).'67 The court
further noted that Congress prohibited any type of regulation that required ac-
cess "for any additional types of video programming."' 68 Finally, the open ac-
cess required by the county was a "traditional common carrier requirement"
specifically prohibited from local regulation."'
2. The Fourth Circuit Finds MediaOne's Cable Facilities to be
"Telecommunications"
On appeal, Fourth Circuit Judge M. Blane Michael began the opinion by
stating that AT&T remained "the largest long distance telephone company in
the country" and this case focused on its business expansion into the high-
speed Internet market provided over cable facilities. 7 ° The Fourth Circuit nar-
rowly interpreted the Communications Act, focusing on the open access provi-
sion that required AT&T to separate MediaOne's Road Runner Internet access
services from its cable platform, and compelled essentially to offer that trans-
165 47 U.S.C. §544(e) (2000).
166 County of Henrico, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 715.
167 Id. The court had found Internet service provided by Road Runner "contains news,
commentary, games, and other proprietary content with which subscribers interact." Id at
715. By narrowly interpreting Road Runner Internet services, the court paralleled the statu-
tory definition of cable service under 47 U.S.C. §541(c)(A), (B).
168 County of Henrico, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 715.
169 Id see also 47 U.S.C. §532(b)(2) (2000) ("Any Federal agency, State, or franchising
authority may not require any cable system to designate channel capacity for commercial
use by unaffiliated persons in excess of the capacity specified [herein]."). For example, the
court also found that under the Act's ban on common carrier requirements, no Federal, State
or local authority could impose content provisions for cable services. Id. at 716. According
to the district judge, Henrico County Ordinance imposing open access on MediaOne meant
that the company had to transmit interactive "content" of other ISP's such as news, elec-
tronic mail, web browsing and other various forms of programming. Id. at 713-16. The
court reasoned this amounted to content regulation of cable services, violating the Commu-
nications Act. Id. at 716; see 47 U.S.C. §544(f)(1) (2000).
170 County of Henrico, 257 F.3d at 359.
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mission pipeline to unaffiliated ISPs. 7 ' Road Runner's cable modem platform,
once unbundled from its Internet access service, became a telecommunications
facility according to the court and demanding from cable operators access con-
ditions to such facilities was inconsistent with the Communications Act.
Reading 47 U.S.C. §541(b)(3)(D) the same way the lower court did, the
Fourth Circuit concluded that although the Communications Act did not define
the word "facilities" when used in the context of "telecommunications facili-
ties," the language of the statute pointed to facilities that "are the physical in-
stallations or infrastructure necessary for transmission." '173 The court looked at
Road Runner's high-speed Internet access-using MediaOne's cable modem
broadband service with Internet connections-and found the cable modem
platform to be the telecommunications facility "because it is a pipeline for
telecommunications."' 74 The Fourth Circuit found Henrico's open access pro-
vision to be preempted by the Communications Act because requiring a cable
operator, such as MediaOne, to provide a telecommunications facility as a
condition for transferring cable franchise control from MediaOne to AT&T
contradicted federal law.
75
Unfortunately, this finding was erroneous because the transmission of in-
formation through this pipeline, according to the Fourth Circuit, was without
change.7 6 However, Internet transmission changes the information, whether it
is an e-mail or video content. The court failed to see this because it focused on
the act of providing the transmission facility rather than the transmission it-
self.7 The County argued that MediaOne offers traditional cable services, and
therefore, under the Communications Act, the cable system cannot be consid-
ered a telecommunications facility.' 78 The court responded and stated that the
Communications Act foresees facilities, some of which can be used to provide
171 Id. at 362-63.
172 Id. at 363.
173 Id.
174 Id. A good example of this would be a company that builds an HOV lane and pro-
vides a vehicle to get you from home to work. This would be a bundled service, and AT&T
essentially argued no other company can rent cars to consumers and use its proprietary HOV
lane. The court agreed with AT&T, saying once you unbundled the road and the vehicle,
the road itself is a telecommunications facility. By applying the plain language of the stat-
ute, rather than defining the proper regulatory classification of Road Runner's Internet ser-
vice, the Fourth Circuit simply held "Henrico County violated §541(b)(3)(D) when it condi-
tioned the transfer of control of MediaOne's cable franchise by requiring MediaOne to un-
bundled its Road Runner service and provide open access" to its cable platform, a telecom-
munications facility. Id. at 365.
175 MediaOne Group, Inc., v. County of Henrico, 257 F.3d 356, 363 (4th Cir. 2001).
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 Id.; see 47 U.S.C §522(7) (2000) (defining a cable system as "a facility ... that is
designed to provide cable services which includes video programming").
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"more than one type of service." '79 Under the 1996 Act, a multi-purpose facil-
ity can receive different types of regulatory classifications, such as telecom-
munications, cable, and even information service.' The court found that Me-
diaOne maintained a "cable system," but it concluded MediaOne's separate
cable modem platform be classified as "telecommunications facilities" when
used to provide Internet access. 8'
This was as far as the court was willing to read into the Act, concluding that
"open access conditions violate ... the Communications Act."' 82 Although the
Fourth Circuit was asked by several parties to determine the specific regulatory
classification of MediaOne's Road Runner Internet service, the court was not
willing to discuss the merits of open access because that issue was not the pre-
sent controversy.'83 The court pointed out that the FCC, in its amicus brief,
had "diplomatically" reminded them that regulating cable broadband, just like
all interstate communications services, fell under its jurisdiction."4 The task of
assigning the proper regulatory classification to high-speed Internet services
"is complex and subject to considerable debate," and best left to the FCC, es-
pecially since they had initiated a proceeding to examine classification and
open access issues.'85 Any final conclusion would have a profound effect on
how the Communications Act treats Internet Services.'86
179 Id. at 364. This was a conclusion that the court did not support with any findings of
fact, and it bordered on regulation, which is best made by the expertise of the FCC.
180 MediaOne Group, Inc., v. County of Henrico, 257 F.3d 356, 364 (4th Cir. 2001). For
example, the court stated 47 U.S.C. §522(7)(C) contemplates a common carrier facility that
offers video services directly to customers to be considered as a cable system, "unless the
extent of such use is solely to provide interactive on-demand services." Id.
18' MediaOne Group, Inc. v. County of Henrico, 257 F.3d at 364.
182 Id.
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 Id. at 365. The court noted that the FCC was well under way to determine the policy
question and related issues. As the court stated, the judges are "content to leave these issues
to the expertise of the FCC." Id. at 365.
186 MediaOne Group, Inc. v. County of Henrico, 257 F.3d at 365 (Widener, C.J., concur-
ring) (arguing that he would arrive at the same conclusion under a different analysis other
than federal preemption). While the Henrico Co. Ordinance required MediaOne to open its
cable modem platform, this was contrary to federal law. Judge Widener's concurrence
pointed out that state law provided that "no locality may regulate cable television systems
by regulations inconsistent with either laws of the Commonwealth or federal law relating to
cable televisions operations. " (emphasis in original). Id.; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-
2108(E) (2004). Judge Widener noted that Virginia law prevented "counties from running
afoul of the Federal Communications Act." Id at 365.
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IV. GIVING DEFERENCE TO THE FINAL ARBITER OF DIFFICULT
AND COMPLEX COMMUNICATIONS DECISIONS SUBJECT TO
DEBATE
When the Pole Attachment Act'87 passed in the late 1970s, Congress sought
to protect a struggling cable industry by setting regulatory caps on the fees paid
to utility companies for using space on utility poles as a right-of-way. "' Util-
ity companies had a monopoly on the poles and the cable industry did not want
to be charged exorbitant pole attachment rates when providing video services
through coax cables attached to the poles. 8 9 The statute gave the FCC en-
forcement authority to "regulate the rates, terms, and conditions for pole at-
tachments," to make sure such agreements are "just and reasonable," and to be
the arbitrator for any pole attachment disputes.' 9 Over the next two decades,
this authority granted by Congress was held to be within the bounds of the
Constitution, encouraged cable companies to offer nonvideo data services in
addition to traditional TV signals, and it permitted both the FCC and the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia to deny utility
companies the ability to charge higher rates for these additional pole attach-
ments. '
187 Communications Act Amendment of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-234, §6, 92 Stat. 33 (codi-
fied at 47 U.S.C. §224 (2000)).
188 S. REP. No. 95-580, at 13 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 109, 121 ("[T]here
is often no practical alternative to a CATV system operator except to utilize available space
on existing poles.").
189 See Tex. Utilities Elec. Co. v. FCC, 997 F.2d 925, 929-30 (D.C. Cir. 1993). As the
court noted, without the protection from pole attachment monopoly prices, the viability of
cable television would have been threatened. Id. at 927. The D.C. Circuit decided that the
Pole Attachment Act was ambiguous as to the FCC authority to regulate cable lines that
transmit non-video service, but the FCC reasonably interpreted the Act to extend its author-
ity and regulate the terms, rates and conditions of these wires. Id. at 395.
190 47 U.S.C. §224(b)(1) (2000) ("[T]he Commission shall take such action as it deems
appropriate and necessary, including issuing cease and desist orders...").
'9' See FCC v. Florida Power Corp, 480 U.S. 245 (1987) (holding that rates set by FCC
did not amount to unconstitutional taking); see also In re Heritage Cablevision Ass'n of
Dallas, L.P, and Texas Cable TV Ass'n, Inc. v. Tex. Utilities Elec. Co., Memorandum Opin-
ion and Order, 6 FCC Rcd. 7099 (1991) (finding cable operator providing traditional
(video) and nontraditional cable service such as broadband communications and data trans-
mission services, merited a single regulated pole attachment by utility pole owner), recon.
dismissed, 7 FCC Rcd. 4192 (1992), aff'd sub nom. Tex. Utilities Elec. Co. v. FCC, 997 F.
2d 925 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (finding the Pole Attachment Act was ambiguous as to the FCC's
authority to regulate additional attachments providing nonvideo services, but its interpreta-
tion finding broad jurisdiction based on Congressional intent was reasonable).
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A. The Eleventh Circuit Regulates the Internet in Gulf Power Company v.
FCC
When Congress amended 47 U.S.C. §224 under the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, it expanded the FCC's regulatory authority to establish a rate
formula for any pole attachment set "by a cable television system or provider
of telecommunications service" to any pole controlled by a telephone or power
utilities.'9 2 The FCC broadly interpreted its legislative jurisdiction to set the
rates for attachments, including any wire attached by a cable operator that de-
livered traditional video and Internet services "commingled on one transmis-
sion facility."'93 Utilities argued unconvincingly that the 1996 Act overruled
prior FCC and court decisions upholding its jurisdiction to regulate such com-
mingled services because either: (1) cable attachments should be used solely
for traditional cable services, otherwise those attachments are subject to tele-
communications service rates; or (2) Internet services did not qualify for cable
or telecommunications services classification, and therefore FCC authority fell
outside the scope of §§224(d) (cable services) and (e) (telecommunications
services). 94  The cable industry said the law applied to any kind of wire
whether it carried a video signal or provided high-speed Internet access; oth-
erwise, it would frustrate the timely deployment of broadband services to con-
sumers. 9 ' The public utilities argued cable companies no longer needed rate
regulation because they were not a struggling industry and therefore were ex-
ploiting an outdated law.'96 "It would make little sense," the Commission con-
cluded, "that a cable operator should lose its rights under Section 224 by com-
mingling Internet and traditional cable services."'97  The Act itself defines
192 Telecommunications Act of 1996 §703(2), 47 U.S.C. §224 (a)(4) (2000).
193 In re Implementation of Section 703(e) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Re-
porter and Order, 13 FCC Rcd. 6777, paras. 30, 40 (1998) (codified at 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.1401 -
1.1418) [hereinafter Pole Report and Order] (finding it was Congress' "intent to expand the
pole attachment provisions beyond their 1978 origins.").
194 Id. at para. 28; see also In re Heritage Cablevision Ass'n of Dallas, L.P, and Texas
Cable TV Ass'n, Inc. v. Tex. Utilities Elec. Co., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 6 FCC
Rcd. 7099 (1991) (finding cable operator providing commingled traditional (video) and
nontraditional cable service such as broadband communications and data transmission ser-
vices, including data transmission on a commingled, merited a single regulated pole attach-
ment by utility pole owner), recon. dismissed, 7 FCC Rcd. 4192 (1992), affd sub nom., Tex.
Utilities Elec. Co. v. FCC, 997 F. 2d 925 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
195 Yocki J. Dreazen & Robert S. Greenberger, High Court Backs Cable-TV Industry on
Pole Fee Rates, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17, 2002.
196 Id.; see also Pole Report & Order, supra note 193, at para. 14.
197 Pole Report and Order, supra note 193, at para. 31 (stating that cable operators
choosing to expand their offerings by providing Internet broadband would be penalized if no
longer entitled to Section 224 benefits. This would be contrary to Congress's intent to bring
competition into the communication industry). The FCC concluded that Congress initially
set out to "remedy the inequitable position between pole owners and those seeking pole
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"pole attachment" to include "any attachment by a cable television system.' ' 98
Therefore, under 47 U.S.C. §224(f), added by the 1996 Act to protect not only
cable but also "a host of new telecommunications carriers," the FCC required
any utility monopoly that owned a pole to allow "nondiscriminatory access"
and gave cable broadband providers that commingled their Internet and video
services space on the utility pole without being charged an additional rate.' 99
Power companies challenged the Pole Report and Order filing several peti-
tions for review in various circuit courts across the country."' These various
petitions triggered a lottery conducted by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation under 47 U.S.C. §2112, and the cases were consolidated in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.20 ' In Gulf Power Co.
v. Federal Communications Commission, the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the
challenges to agency regulations applying the two-step Chevron analysis.
212
The court read §224(f) without ambiguity and decided "pure statutory con-
struction" should govern the case and gave no deference to the FCC's expert
analysis regarding the 1996 Act.2 3 The Eleventh Circuit became an immediate
attachments. The nature of this relationship is not altered when the cable operator seeks to
provide additional service." Id.
198 47 U.S.C. §224(a)(4) (2000). (emphasis added).
199 Gulf Power Co. v. FCC, 208 F.3d 1263, 1268 (11 th Cir. 2000).
200 Id. at 1266; see 47 U.S.C §402(a) (2000) ("Any proceeding to enjoin, set aside, annul,
or suspend any order of the Commission under this chapter (except those appealable under
subsection (b) of this section) shall be brought as provided by and in the manner prescribed
in chapter 158 of title 28."); see also 28 U.S.C. §2342(1) (2000) ("The court of appeals
(other than the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) has exclusive juris-
diction to enjoin, set aside, suspend (in whole or in part), or to determine the validity of all
final orders of the Federal Communications Commission made reviewable by section 402
(a) of title 47."); see also 28 U.S.C. §2112(a)(3) (consolidating multidistrict litigations in
one circuit court selected by random lottery procedure).
201 See 47 U.S.C. §2112(a)(3) (2000). As will be evident by this Comment and the sub-
sequent Supreme Court decision, the Eleventh Circuit was incorrect in its interpretation of
the 1996 Act, as well as its non-application of administrative deference. Had this case
landed at the D.C. Circuit Court instead of Atlanta, the case would probably have come out
differently, given the D.C. Circuits decision in Texas Utilities. See supra text and accompa-
nying note 187-191.
202 Gulf Power Co. v. FCC, 208 F.3d 1263, 1271-72 (11 th Cir. 2000), rev'd and rem'd,
Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n, Inc. v. Gulf Power Co., 534 U.S. 327 (2002).
We use the two-step Chevron analysis to review agency interpretations of a statute.
Under Chevron step one, we determine whether Congress has spoken unambiguously
to the question at issue. If it has, our inquiry ends; we give effect to Congress' intent.
Under Chevron step two, if we determine that Congress' intent is ambiguous, we defer
to a reasonable agency interpretation of Congress' intent.
Id.; see generally Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
203 Gulf Power Co., 208 F.3d at 1273 n.21 ("[Q]uestions of pure statutory construction
fall within a Chevron step one analysis. We therefore owe no deference to an agency's
construction of a statute."). The court essentially read §224(f) in a vacuum rather than look-
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expert on communications law, and two judges decided to impose their wis-
dom over that of the FCC's staff. The court found that the FCC had no statu-
tory authority to regulate Internet services because 47 U.S.C. §224(a)(4), (d)-
(e) only prescribed pole attachments rates for a cable television system or pro-
vider of telecommunications services. 204 The Eleventh Circuit read the plain
language of the Pole Attachment Act proscribing two regulatory rates and con-
cluded the FCC could only exert jurisdiction if Internet services qualified as
either cable or telecommunications service." 5 The court narrowly read the
definition of cable services under the Communications Act and concluded that
Internet service was neither a cable nor telecommunications service."206 The
judges mistakenly took it upon themselves not only to characterize the regula-
tory scheme cable broadband deserved (an administrative function), but also to
restrain the Commission's authority over this type of communications service
(a legislative function).0 7
Although the legislative history showed Congress' forward-thinking intent
to see cable video programming move towards an interactive service, the court
found no significant changes in defining cable services under either the 1978
or 1996 Act. 8 If Congress wanted to expand the definition of cable services to
include all types of interactive services, including the Internet, it would have
done it, according to the court. 9 Despite the fact that the definition of cable
ing at the entire 1996 Act, meant to provide an unfettered communications environment.
204 Id. at 1276. (Carnes, C.J., dissenting in part) (stating that the plain language of
§224(b)(1) mandates the court to find the FCC has regulatory authority over Internet ser-
vices) Based on the definition of pole attachment under §224(a)(4) as "any attachment by a
cable television system," Judge Carnes pointed out the Eleventh Circuit Court had previ-
ously ruled that the adjective 'any' has an expansive meaning. Id. at 1280.
205 Id.
206 Id. The argument of whether the Commission had the jurisdiction to regulate the
Internet as a telecommunications service was not and issue raised by the FCC to the court.
Id. at 1277. The Eleventh Circuit stated such argument could not have been raised in any
instance because the Commission had previously defined the Internet as an information
service, not a cable service. Id. See Universal Service Report, supra note 56, at para. 66("Internet service providers themselves provide information services . . ."). The court's
circular argument however lacks merit because the FCC could only classify Internet services
as information services if it had jurisdiction.
207 In one way the court said that the statute was unambiguous, but when defining Inter-
net service, it was not clear what Congress intended. Therefore it imposed its own regula-
tory definition for what cable service could and could not include, limiting the innovate
growth of new technologies.
208 Gulf Power Co. v. FCC, 208 F.3d 1263, 1276 (1 1th Cir. 2000) ("The only difference
between th[e] definition of 'cable services' [found in the 1978 Act vs. 1996 Act] is the addi-
tion of the words 'or use'."); see 47 U.S.C §522(6)(A)(B) (2000). The court found that the
only mention by Congress of expanding the scope of "cable services" was found in a House
report that stated "or use" was meant to "reflect the evolution of video programming to-
wards interactive services." Gulf Power Co., 208 F.3d at 1276.
209 Gulf Power Co., 208 F.3d at 1276.
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services includes "the one-way transmission to subscribers of video program-
ming or other programming service, and subscriber interaction . . . or other
programming service," the court did not want to read this section so broadly as
to include Internet services."' The court pointed out that this definition of ca-
ble services was quite similar under the 1996 Act when Congress passed the
Pole Attachment Act in 1978."' Interestingly, the Eleventh Circuit "epipha-
nized" that the Internet wasn't around during the Carter Administration and
therefore "[w]hen Congress used this language then, it could not have intended
it to cover Internet services provided by cable companies."'
21 2
The Eleventh Circuit relegated the decision by its sister D.C. Circuit in
Texas Utilities Electric Co. v. FCC to a footnote, essentially stating that it was
more competent to decide this issue than the D.C. Circuit.2 1 In Texas Utilities,
the D.C. Circuit had given deference to the FCC for almost the same decision
to regulate cable lines as pole attachments whether they carried video or data.2 4
The Eleventh Circuit pointed out the case was decided prior to Congress pass-
ing the 1996 Act.2"5 During the time of polyester pants and bellbottoms, Con-
gress did not specify the "type of service to be distributed over the attach-
ment," whereas after the 1996 Act, Congress eliminated any ambiguity, and
now, emphasized "the type of service over the type of entity. '2'6 As proof of
this erroneous conclusion, it noted that §224(d)(3), as amended, read "solely
cable services" are subject to the FCC's cable rate formula.2 7 Therefore, the
Eleventh Circuit did not need to follow the D.C. Circuit.2"8 However, the stat-
ute actually reads this way:
This subsection shall apply to the rate for any pole attachment used by a cable television
system solely to provide cable services. Until the effective date of the regulations required
under subsection (e) of this section, this subsection shall also apply to the rate for any pole
attachment used by a cable system or any telecommunications carrier (to the extent such
carrier is not a party to a pole attachment agreement) to provide any telecommunications
service.
219
210 Id. at 1276-77; see also 47 U.S.C §522(6)(B) (2000).
211 GulfPower Co., 208 F.3d at 1276.
212 Id. at 1277. This disregards the fact that other sections of the Communications Act
mention the Internet. For the court to conclude that Congress needs to write the word
"Internet" everywhere it intends for this service to expand, it was mistaken. This would be
an inefficient way to write legislation. That is why Congress established the Federal Com-
munications Commission.
213 Id. at 1277, n.32 ("Because we now know that [47 U.S.C. §224(d)(3)] emphasizes the
type of service over the type of entity acquiring the attachment, we have no need to follow
the reasoning of Texas Utilities Electric Co.").
214 See Texas Utilities Electric Co. v. FCC, 977 F.2d 925 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
215 Gulf Power Co. v. FCC, 208 F.3d 1263, 1277 n.32 (11 th Cir. 2000).
216 Id.
217 Id.
218 Id.
219 47 U.S.C. §224(d)(3) (2000) (emphasis added). Section 224(e) set a statutory dead-
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The court did not ignore 8224(d)(3) which mentioned i to provide any tele-
communications service, i but rather it accepted the FCC at its word when the
Commission i specifically said that the Internet is not a telecommunications
service. V20 So the Eleventh Circuit decided the FCC knew better when it came
to defining communication terms, but statutory interpretation was best left to
them, not the D.C. Circuit, and certainly not the administrative experts.
B. The Supreme Court Brings Sense to Statutory Construction and
Administrative Decision Making
The FCC appealed the decision to the Supreme Court, arguing that Congres-
sional intent found in the text of the Pole Attachment Act required reversal. 22,
Between the Eleventh Circuitis statutory construction and the FCC, it was the
Commissionis construction of the Communications Act that was entitled to
deference. 22 The FCC argued that the court should not have been compelled to
characterize Internet services as neither qualifying for cable television services
or telecommunications service because this issue was expressly left undecided
by the Commission for another day.2 Read in its entirety, the 1996 Aclis pol-
line for the FCC to set iregulations to govern the charges for pole attachments used by tel e-
communications carriers to provide telecommunications services Id. 8224(e)(1). Because
B224(d) set one rate formula for cable systems and 8224(e) set another rate formula for tele-
communications carriers, one could read the words isolely to provide cable servicesi as
differentiating between two types of services after the statutory deadline expires.
220 Gulf Power Co. v. FCC, 208 F.3d 1263, 1277 (1 1th Cir. 2000) (stating that previous
FCC policy decisions had concluded that Internet services were not the provision of a tele-
communications service under the 1996 Act.?); see also Pole Report and Order, supra note
193, at para. 33. In one way, the court accepted the FCCis reasonable interpretation that
Internet services were not telecommunications, but then it rejected the Commission addi-
tional findings. One could argue that if an administrative body did the Eleventh Circuitis
ruling, such decision would be bit arbitrary and capricious.
221 Brief for the Federal Petitioner, 2001 WL 345195, at 27-28, Natil Cable & Tele-
comm. Assin, Inc. v. Gulf Power, 534 U.S. 327 (2002) (No. 00-832, 00-843) [hereinafter
FCC Gulf Petition].
222 Id. The FCC tried to make the case that nothing in B224 required a narrow statutory
interpretation. If Congress wanted to limit the Commissionis authority to regulate pole
attachments providing traditional cable services, they would have been explicit in the legi s-
lation.
223 Id. at 29-30. The FCC had not taken a position on the type of regulatory scheme
merited to Internet services, stating that making such a decision would have ivery broad
implications for the rights and obligations of cable systems.i Id. at 30. The issue left unan-
swered by the FCC was the question of open access 6 should cable systems be forced to
open their cable modem platform to independent, third party ISPs? The FCC told the SI-
preme Court that even if it felt a final decision could not be reached until some legal author-
ity properly characterized cable broadband, then the case should be remanded back to the
Commission for a proper regulatory finding. Id. at 30-31.
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icy was to make Internet services widely available . 24 The Eleventh Circuit's
interpretation of the 1996 Act meant cable operators would provide broadband
services at their peril, losing any rate protection. 25
When the case arrived at the Supreme Court, Solicitor General James
Feldman argued from the onset that the FCC read the definition of pole at-
tachment under §224 to clearly include any attachment by a cable television
system.26 At issue was the use of these attachments by cable operators to pro-
vide bundled video and Internet access. 22' One of the first questions Mr.
Feldman was asked focused on distinguishing between who was doing the at-
taching and its purpose - "is Internet access part of a cable television sys-
tem?" - and responding that the FCC had not decided the issue. 28 Justice
Scalia's line of questioning centered on the proper regulatory definition and
whether the attachment used by a cable television system is an attachment used
for television services, telecommunications, or something else? 229 The Gov-
ernment argued it would not matter because any attachment would be covered
under §224(a)(4) in either situation.23 ' But then Justice Scalia asked, "how the
[C]ommission could possibly resolve [the proper rate for Internet services]
without ever purporting to decide whether Internet is telecommunications?"
23
'
Mr. Feldman argued that the FCC had jurisdiction under 47 U.S.C. §224(d)
and (e) to set the rates for any attachment, no matter what the regulatory defini-
tion would be under cable or telecommunications services. 23 2 Although Justice
Kennedy pointed out that Internet service could theoretically be classified as
neither cable nor telecommunications, the Court did take note that the agency's
view on the proper regulatory definition was under a proceeding review.
233
The Court was concerned whether the FCC acted under general authority or
224 Id. at 21.
225 Id.
226 TRANSCRIPT OF ORAL ARGUMENTS, Nat'l. Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n, Inc. v. Gulf
Power Co., 2001 WL 1183370, at 4-5 (2001) [hereinafter ORAL ARGUMENTS].
227 Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n, Inc.. v. Gulf Power Co., 534 U.S. 327, 330 (2002).
228 Id. at 6. Counsel for Respondents, Thomas P. Steindler argued that if the FCC had
gone through the administrative procedure to classify cable modem service as either cable,
telecommunications, or information services, and that decision would have survived judicial
review, then respondents would not have a claim. Id. at 42. But the reason why both par-
ties were arguing before the Court, according to Mr. Steindler, was the FCC's refusal to
arrive at a classification for broadband over cable services. Id. at 43.
229 Id. at 7.
230 Id. Respondents argued that under the doctrine of exlusio unius that section §§224
(d) and (e) "are the only purposes that are authorized here, and others are intended to be
excluded". Id. at 31. The Eleventh Circuit had concluded "that §§224(d) and (e) implic-
itly limit the reach of §224(a)(4) ... as a result, it was compelled to reach the question of the
correct categorization of Internet services." Gulf Power, 534 U.S. at 336-37.
231 Id. at 7.
232 ORAL ARGUMENTS, supra note 226, at 9-10.
233 Id. at 10.
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specific authority to regulate cable under 47 U.S.C. §224(d) or to regulate tele-
communications under 47 U.S.C. §224(e). 34 The Justices repeatedly asked
whether it would be best to remand the issue of jurisdictional basis back to the
FCC. 235 The Government argued that the FCC acted under general authority to
regulate the rate of any attachment by a cable television system, whatever that
attachment could be.3 Justice Ginsburg clarified, "[s]o, you're asking us to
say that the FCC does have authority. Which particular rate category it falls
under is for another day." '237 The Government replied, "[t]hat's right ... [Con-
gress] had an intent that Internet access should be characterized however it
should be characterized ... the fact that the cable television system is provid-
ing something else through that wire . . . doesn't preclude the FCC's jurisdic-
tion. '238 Finally, the Justices asked about a proper outcome to resolve the mat-
ter if they reversed the Eleventh Circuit and found the FCC to have general
jurisdiction: (1) would the case "have to await [the] ongoing rule making to
determine which category [broadband over cable] this is, or (2) would there be
something for the Eleventh [Circuit] to do on remand once we say [the FCC
has] jurisdiction to do something?" '239 The Government argued that the only
issue before the Eleventh Circuit on remand would be to decide the reasonable
analysis conducted by the FCC to arrive at a decision. 40
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, concluded that 47 U.S.C. §224
was unambiguous and the Act's plain text defining pole attachment as "any
attachment by a cable television system" was the proper issues "and ... what
matters under the statute. '24' The Court concluded that a cable attached by a
234 Id. at 33-34.
235 Id. at 10-11, 19-20.
236 Id. at 12. Respondents not only argued that Congress would have "intended to give
jurisdiction that was undefined," but also Mr. Steindler argued this was a unique case be-
cause it involved the electric industry, regulated by the Federal Electrical Regulatory Com-
mission. Id. at 33-35 One justice counter-argued by saying, "Yes, but it's very narrow be-
cause they're only talking about attachments to utility poles." Id. at 35.
237 ORAL ARGUMENTS, supra note 226, at 13.
238 Id. at 13, 18-19.
239 Id. at 20.
240 Id. Essentially, the DOJ argued that the Eleventh Circuit would be doing a Chevron
step 2 analysis on remand.
241 Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n, Inc. v. Gulf Power Co., 534 U.S. 327, 333 (2002),
quoting 47 U.S.C. §224(a)(4) (2000). (emphasis added). The Respondents had argued that a
communication entity can best be regulated under the 1996 Act by the type of service it
does. See ORAL ARGUMENTS, supra note 226, at 32-34. The Court answered this line of
reasoning by stating "the word 'by' still limits pole attachments by who is doing the attach-
ing, not by what is attached." Id. at 335. So, if a cable facility offers video and Internet
services, it still remains a cable television system. This completely ignores the convergence
of communications. See id at 339 (finding a contradictory interpretation of the 1996 Act
would defeat Congress' general instructions to the FCC to encourage the deployment of
broadband Internet capability).
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cable operator remains an attachment, whether you provide video, Internet, or
possibly telephone 4.2  As the Court noted, "[t]he addition of a service does not
change the character of the attaching entity-the entity the attachment is
'by.' ' 243 But even if this reading of the statute was ambiguous, the Court said
that the FCC's interpretation would still be accepted, providing it was reason-
able. 44 Even though the statute did not mention the Internet or information
services, the Court concluded that the FCC has "authority to fill gaps where the
statute is silent.
245
Like a father instructing its twelve circuit court children about reviewing fu-
ture FCC administrative decisions, the Supreme Court found the 1996 Act to
increase the agency's authority, especially with issues that are "technical,
complex, and dynamic. '246 Although Respondents argued that the FCC dodged
the difficult regulatory category for Internet and commingled services, the
Court found the FCC could not be faulted for making piecemeal conclusions. 47
242 Id. at 333. The Court pointed out that Respondents raised the issue of attachment
propriety not argued to the Eleventh Circuit of the FCC. Id. at 328. One should not look at
who is doing the attaching but rather what does the attachment do? If the attachment does
anything outside of traditional cable services, meaning besides video, then the service falls
outside the Act. Obviously, this argument completely ignores the reason why Congress
passed the 1996 Act, which was to move communications into the future and not the past.
One could read between the lines that the Supreme Court would grant the FCC wide discre-
tion on a "technical and complex" subject matter such as categorizing Internet services. Id.
at 328.
243 Id. at 333.
244 Id. In other words, the Court if applying step one or step two Chevron deference,
would still conclude that the FCC made the right call. As the Court pointed out, the burden
would be placed on the Respondents to 1) "refute the proposition that 'any attachment'
means 'any attachment' and 2) " they must prove also the FCC's interpretation is unrea-
sonable." Id.
245 Id. at 339. The Court concluded that if the FCC reversed its findings and eventually
decided that broadband was not a cable service, then the agency's "interpretation of
§§224(a)(4) and (b) [was] sensible." Id. at 328.
246 Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n, Inc.. v. Gulf Power Co., 534 U.S. 327, 336 (2002).
In the Court's reading of §224, Congress intended to increase the FCC's jurisdiction. When
Congress crafted the 1996 Act, it was aware that both the FCC and the D.C. Circuit Court
had addressed the issue of regulating commingled services such as video and data over cable
lines. Id. at 360. Despite the D.C. Circuit's conclusion in Texas Utilities, Congress did not
limit §224(a)(4) and (b) but rather it maintained the FCC's broad authority. Id. Under the
Act, "cable television systems that also provide Internet services are still covered by
§224(a)(4) and (b)-just as they were before 1996." Id at 336. In one way, the High Court
proclaimed that both the FCC and the D.C. Circuit Court are competent to handle communi-
cations law and policy questions.
247 Gulf Power, 534 U.S. at 338. Respondents could not understand how the FCC could
set a §224(d) rate without categorizing Internet services or deciding whether commingled
services are cable services under the Act. The Court's majority left this issue unresolved for
another day. Justice Thomas, along with Justice Souter dissenting in the opinion, argued
"the specific legal issue the Court chooses to address is, at this time, nothing more than a
tempest in a teapot." Id. at 348.
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There was no way for Congress to know exactly how to regulate the pole at-
tachment rates for future commingled services such as cable TV and broad-
band (and now possibly VoIP) when it passed the 1996 Act.248 The FCC has
the statutory discretion to make policy that impacts broadband. Perhaps judi-
cial review should give greater deference to the agency under the Chevron
standard.249
In this case, the FCC made a policy decision not to subject the cable indus-
try to utility monopoly pricing, instead allowing market forces, investment and,
innovation to thrive. If it were done otherwise, then such regulation "would
defeat Congress' general instruction to the FCC to 'encourage the deployment'
of broadband Internet capability and if necessary, 'to accelerate deployment of
such capability by removing barriers to infrastructure investment'.""25  The
Court concluded that if the FCC arrived at a conclusion based on this congres-
sional mandate, then courts should find it reasonable.'
C. FCC Finally Decides to Classify and Deregulate Broadband Over Cable
One reason why the federal courts in City of Portland, County of Henrico,
and Gulf Power were compelled to litigate the merits of broadband over cable
regulation can be traced back to the FCC leadership's lack of policy direc-
tion. 52 At that time, FCC Chairman William Kennard sent mixed messages to
industry and local government officials, advocating the importance of a na-
tional policy for broadband, while touting the merits of open access.- Cable
248 Id. at 339. In this case, the regulation centered on the "just and reasonable" rates the
Commission. This could be said about any regulatory scheme that affects or impacts com-
mingled services, especially those that involve broadband. As previously noted, Congress
knew the FCC and the D.C. Circuit had dealt with cable systems provided two different
services along its attachments, and yet it did reverse those decisions through legislation.
249 Id. at 339. The fact that the Court was willing to extend Chevron deference to the
FCC without remanding the issue of regulatory interpretation back to the agency or the
Eleventh Circuit, was a signal to all Circuit Courts that difficult questions that were techni-
cal, complex and dynamic should be left to experts in communications policy.
250 Id. quoting Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, §706(a), (b), and
(c)(1), 110 Stat. 153 (set forth as note following 47 U.S.C. 157 (2000)).
251 Id. at 338-39 ("We note that the FCC, subsequent to the order under review, has reit-
erated that it has not yet categorized Internet services."). When the Court stated issues sur-
rounding the regulatory classification of communications services would be difficult, dy-
namic in nature, and therefore best left to the FCC, the Justices seems to be anticipating a
future Certiorari request. Id at 336. The Court tried to give other Circuits some instructions
on how to approach judicial review and administrative deference. Apparently, the Ninth
Circuit disregarded the Supreme Court.
252 Gruley, supra note 4, Al ("Policy makers are writing, or choosing not to write, rules
that will determine who gets access to the pipelines that connect people to the Internet...").
253 Kathy Chen, FCC's Kennard to Argue Against Rules on Broadband Web Access at
Local Level, WALL ST. J., July 21, 1999, at A4 [hereinafter Chen, Web Access] ("Mr. Ken-
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industry leaders such as AT&T Corp. Chairman C. Michael Armstrong became
frustrated with local governments imposing communications policy with na-
tional implications. 254 Due to the lack of leadership coming from the FCC, Mr.
Armstrong began to ask Congressional leaders for a clear direction on this is-
sue.211 Some commentators referred to the FCC as "the giant who refused to
come on stage," while a business article reported that court battles such as
these could potentially have influence on E-commerce, all because of the fed-
eral vacuum.256
Chairman Kennard announced in June of 2000 that the FCC would launch a
Notice of Inquiry to seek comments on the implications of regulating broad-
band over cable as either a telecommunications, cable or information service.
5
Although industry experts stated that such proceedings addressing the regula-
tory classification of cable modem service would likely be completed within a
year, it wasn't until after the Supreme Court nudged the FCC that the Commis-
sion finally arrived at a regulatory decision.2 8 This inquiry lasted nearly two
years, receiving over 250 filings, with input from various industry representa-
tives, consumer advocates, and both state and local government officials.
259
The FCC's Cable Declaratory Ruling concluded that "cable modem ser-
vice, as it is currently offered, is properly classified as an interstate information
nard... wants to ensure a national no-regulation policy for the Internet, rather than let local
governments impose rules. [However], FCC staff will meet with the agency's local and
state government committee this week to hear local officials concerns and explain his
stance."). Chairman Kennard was telling local government to stay out of the federal courts
and perhaps all parties could come to some resolve. However, that kind of compromise
should be left up to Congress when drafting communication legislation. The FCC Chair-
man, appointed by President Bill Clinton, was trying to appease consumer groups by advo-
cating open access to broadband cable. However, if companies were going to spend money
upgrading their cable systems, they did not want to have a free rider problem. Chairman
Kennard failed to be a regulator, instead wanting to be a legislator. See also Lake and Brill,
supra note 28, at 8.
254 Kathy Chen, AT&T to Appeal Florida Internet-Access Ruling, WALL ST. J., July 15,
1999, at B6 [hereinafter Chen, Appeal] ("Mr. Armstrong argued that open access should be
addressed at the national level."); see also Kathy Chen, Another Cable Vote Over Open
Lines Upsets AT&T Plan, WALL ST. J. July 14, 1999, at B7 [hereinafter Chen, Cable Vote].
Not only was AT&T fighting with local government officials in Portland, Oregon, but the
Commissioner in Broward County, Florida had also voted to require cable television sys-
tems to open their lines to rival ISPs. Id.
255 Lake and Brill, supra note 28, at 8.
256 Gruley, supra note 4, at A 1.
257 See In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and
Other Facilities, Notice of Inquiry, 15 FCC Rcd. 19,287 (2000) [hereinafter Cable Access
NOI]; see also Lake and Brill, supra note 28, at 8 ("The agency's resulting ruling will be
reviewable in the federal courts, and normally would be entitled to deference-although it
will be interesting if review ends up in the 9 th Circuit...").
258 See generally Cable Declaratory Ruling, supra note 15, at paras. 3-4, n. 10- 11.
259 Lake and Brill, supra note 28, at 8.
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service, not as a cable service, and that there is no separate offering of tele-
communications service."2" Prior to these cases, the FCC had concluded
"Internet access service is appropriately classified as an information service,
because the provider offers a single, integrated service, Internet access, to the
subscriber."2 ' With respect to broadband over cable, and consistent with the
1996 Act, cable modem services "does not include an offering of telecommu-
nications services to subscribers" but rather broadband provides these capabili-
ties via telecommunications.262 In the Universal Report, cited by the FCC in
the Cable Declaratory Ruling and once again adopting similar policy conclu-
sions, found the definitions of "information services" and "telecommunications
services" under the 1996 Act had established mutually exclusive categories of
service.263
The Commission's findings and conclusions reminded everyone that the Su-
preme Court in Nat 'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass 'n v. Gulf Power Co. observed, in
connection with the FCC's interpretation of the Pole Attachment Act and its
application to cable modem service, that the subject matter of defining the
regulatory scheme of Internet broadband over cable was "technical, complex,
and dynamic; and as a general rule, agencies have authority to fill gaps where
the statutes are silent." "6 The Ninth Circuit regulators should have heeded
these words. As the FCC pointed out, in AT&T v. City of Portland, the Ninth
Circuit made its decision "based on a record that was less than comprehen-
sive. ' '265 The Commission noted that the Ninth Circuit could have made a nar-
row ruling by "finding that a cable modem service is not a cable service." '66
After the FCC explained its detailed analysis of what the 1996 Act mandated,
it concluded, "that cable modem service is .. .an interstate information ser-
vice" and its regulation falls squarely within the FCC's jurisdiction. 67
260 Cable Declaratory Ruling, supra note 15, at para. 7.
261 Id. at para. 36.
262 Id. at para. 39; see also 47 U.S.C. §153 (2000).
263 See Universal Service Report, supra note 56, at para. 39 ("[W]hen an entity offers
transmission incorporating the 'capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming,
processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available information,'.., it offers an 'informa-
tion service' even though it uses telecommunications to do so.").
264 Nat' Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n, Inc. v. Gulf Power Co., 534 U.S. 327, 339 (2002).
265 Cable Declaratory Ruling, supra note 15, at para. 57. See supra text and accompany-
ing notes 123-125.
266 Cable Declaratory Ruling, supra note 15, at para. 58. See supra text and accompany-
ing notes 126-128.
267 Cable Declaratory Ruling, supra note 15, at para. 59.
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V. REGULATING BROADBAND FROM THE BENCH
A. Brand X Internet Service v. FCC
In a consolidated case of seven petitions seeking review of the Commis-
sion's Declaratory Ruling from three different circuits, the court in Brand X
Internet Service v. FCC26 revisited its previous decision in AT&T v. City of
Portland on a related matter. 269 In Portland, the Ninth Circuit concluded that
broadband Internet service to subscribers over cable broadband facilities was
partly a telecommunications service under the Communications Act.27 In
Brand X, the court stated that "[w]e must decide whether our prior interpreta-
tion of the Telecommunications Act controls review of the [FCC's] decision to
classify Internet service provided by cable companies exclusively as an inter-
state 'information service.""'27 The court vacated the FCC's finding that cable
modem service is an information service.272 Its opinion was based on stare
decisis.73
The Ninth Circuit's decision was a big financial win, not only for Brand X
Internet Services and other ISP's like EarthLink,274 but also for telephone com-
panies who compete with cable companies by providing high-speed Internet
services using DSL. 275 These entities were not keen on having to compete for
broadband services under two different regulatory schemes. 76 By contradict-
268 345 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2003).
269 See discussion infra Parts III.A. 1.2.
270 AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2000).
271 Brand X Internet Services v. FCC, 345 F.3d 1120, 1123 (9th Cir. 2003).
272 Id. at 1125 ("[W]e held [in Portland] that cable modem service contained both infor-
mation service and telecommunications service components.").
273 Id. at 1132. See supra note 16-20 and accompanying text.
274 See Dave Baker, Earthlink's Vice President of Law and Public Policy, Press State-
ment, Earthlink offers response to FCC Filing, (Aug. 28, 2004) ("Instead of fighting to pro-
tect cable monopolies, the FCC should recognize that cable modem and other broadband
users deserve choice in high-speed Internet providers.").
275 See Dan Ackman, Big Win for Brand X, Forbes.com, at
www.forbes.com/2003/10/07/cx-da 1007topnews (Oct. 7, 2003).
276 Sherille Ismail, Parity Rules: Mapping Regulatory Treatment of Similar Services, 56
FED. COM. L. J. 447, 485 (2004) ("Perhaps the most significant barrier to achieving regula-
tory parity is that it is rarely the case that two types of providers are so alike that they must
be treated in exactly the same manner."); see also Wireline Broadband NPRM, supra note
10, at para. 25 ("[I]n the case where an entity combines transmission over its own facilities
with its offering of wireline Internet access service, the classification of that input is tele-
communications, and not a telecommunications service."); see also Cable Declaratory Rul-
ing, supra note 15, at para. 85 ("To what extent should our decision regarding multiple ISP
access requirements be influenced by the desirability of 'regulatory parity'?"). Pending
legislation introducing in the Senate and referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation would require the FCC to develop rules that provide for parity in regula-
tory treatment of broadband service providers and broadband access services providers. See
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ing the FCC and concluding that cable modem broadband services are neither
exclusively "information service" nor "telecommunications service" but rather
a combination of the two, cable television companies would be subject to
open-access rules that govern the telephone industry. 77
B. Parties Seek Writ of Certiorari
The FCC and the United States Solicitor General challenged the Ninth Cir-
cuit's decision as a usurpation of national communications policy that the ex-
pert administrative agency developed, based on a Congressional mandate."7 In
essence, the court limited the growth of cable broadband services by imposing
burdensome regulations. 79 The communications policies at issue in this case,
according to the FCC, were of "of immediate and compelling national impor-
tance" that will either promote or delay "the timely and universal deployment
of broadband Internet access.""28
Along with the Government, the National Cable and Telecommunications
Association ("NCTA") joined by Charter Communications, Cox Communica-
tions, and Time Warner Cable Inc., asked the Supreme Court to review the
Ninth Circuit's decision to vacate the FCC's conclusion that broadband over
cable was an information service. 8 ' As Petitioner, NCTA sought a writ of
certiorari and argued that this decision "could not be more pivotal to the future
Broadband Regulatory Parity Act of 2002, S. 2430, 107th Cong. 2d Sess. (2002).
277 Brand X Internet Services v. FCC, 345 F. 3d 1120, 1127, n. 11 (9th Cir. 2003). The
practical result of such a classification is that cable broadband providers would be required
to open their lines to competing ISPs. As the Commission pointed out in its Cable Declara-
tory Ruling, although the Ninth Circuit in Portland determined that broadband over cable
was in part a telecommunications service, the court also acknowledge the FCC "has broad
authority to forbear" any type of telecommunications regulation that the Commission con-
cludes it is in the best interest of consumers under §10 of the Communications Act, 47
U.S.C. §160. See AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F. 3d 871, 879 (9th Cir. 2000); see
also Cable Declaratory Ruling, supra note 15, at para. 58 n.219. Although the FCC con-
cluded it would not forbear from Title I1 regulation in this instance, "we do tentatively con-
clude that such regulation [cable modem service in part telecommunications service] would
not be appropriate and . . . should forbear." Id. The Ninth Circuit practically endorsed the
FCC's broad authority when it acknowledged "Congress reposed the details of telecommu-
nications policy in the FCC, and we will not impinge on its authority over these matters."
AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d at 879-80.
278 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, FCC v. Brand X Internet Services, 2004 WL
1943678 at 15 (2004) (No. 04-281) [hereinafter FCC Petition].
279 Paul Davidson, FCC Asks High Court to Rule on Broadband, USA TODAY, Aug. 31,
2004, at B3.
280 FCC Petition, supra note 278, at 15. ("Rejecting the FCC's expert conclusion is par-
ticularly unsettling because the Ninth Circuit refused to analyze the merits of the FCC's
statutory interpretation.").
281 John Eggerton, NCTA, Too, Seeks Brand X Review, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Aug.
31, 2004.
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of not only cable modem service but also all other forms of broadband. 282
NCTA agreed with the FCC's conclusion that broadband services should be
minimally regulated." 3 If the Ninth Circuit's decision to regulate cable modem
service in part as a telecommunications service is not overturned, then NCTA
contended "cable modem service and by extension every other broadband ser-
vice ... [will be subjected to] common carrier regulation. '284 This could stifle
much needed investment, innovation, and broadband deployment for the U.S
economy. 85
C. The Ninth Circuit Applies the Wrong Standard to Sound FCC Policy
The legal questions raised by both parties in part involved Chevron U.S.A.
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council.286 Under the Supreme Court's two-
step Chevron deference analysis to judicial review of administrative statute
construction, a circuit court's first step is to determine:
[W]hether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. if the intent of
Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the Court, as well as the agency, must
give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court de-
termines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue... [and] the stat-
ute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is
whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute
287
Under step two of the Chevron analysis, if a statute found in the Communica-
tions Act is silent or ambiguous on the precise question, then the court should
determine whether the FCC's interpretation of agency-administered statutes is
reasonable and if so, it will defer to the agency. 88 The Ninth Circuit refused to
extend Chevron deference in Brand X because stare decisis under AT&T v.
City of Portland trumped ensuing agency statutory interpretation.289 This
282 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, NCTA v. Brand X Internet Services, 2004 WL
1944011, at *18 (2004) (No. 04-277) [hereinafter NCTA Petition]. The FCC has expressed
an intent "to develop an analytical framework that is consistent, to the extent possible,
across multiple platforms," including cable, telephone, terrestrial wireless, and satellite fa-
cilities); see also Wireline Broadband NPRM, supra note 10, at para. 6.
283 NCTA Petition, supra note 282, at 17-19.
284 Id. at 19.
285 See generally U.S. Chamber Report, supra note 68, at 31.
286 467 U.S 837 (1984).
287 Id. at 842-43 (instructing circuit courts that if it determines "Congress did not di-
rectly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own
construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative inter-
pretation.") (emphasis added). It would have been difficult to define the regulatory classifi-
cation of Internet services in the 1996 Act, since this communications medium was in its
inception.
288 Id.
289 Brand X Internet Services v. FCC, 345 F. 3d 1120, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003) (Thomas,
C.J., concurring) ("[O]nce we have fulfilled our judicial function in interpreting an act of
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analysis was apparently supported by Neal v. United States according to the
Ninth Circuit's reading of this Supreme Court case.29
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and both the FCC and the U.S. So-
licitor General raised two issues in their petitions regarding legal certainty and
clarification by the Justices.29' The first question presented was whether a cir-
cuit court's construction of the Communications Act remains binding prece-
dent within the Ninth Circuit, even in light of FCC's subsequent contrary in-
terpretation of the statute.292 Currently, there is a circuit split on the relations
between stare decisis and administrative rule making.293 The second legal is-
Congress and have determined the meaning is clear, the subsequent action of an agency
cannot and should not alter our conclusion."). Though the Ninth Circuit stated their previ-
ous interpretation in Portland on how the 1996 Act classifies broadband services wasn't
"the only one possible," the court hinted they might read the relevant sections of the Act as
unambiguous. Id. at 1131.
290 516 U.S 284, 294-95 (1996) ("Once we have determined a statute's meaning, we
adhere to our ruling under the doctrine of stare decisis, and we assess an agency's later in-
terpretation of the statute against that settled law."); see also Brand X Internet Services v.
FCC, 345 F. 3d 1120, 1132 (9th Cir. 2003) ("[T]there is nothing to suggest that Neal's rule
should apply only when it is the Supreme Court (and not the court of appeals) construing the
statute in question.").
291 See Ross A. Bunstrock & Michael B. Hazzard, FCC Appeals "Brand X" Decision to
Supreme Court, at http://www.wcsr.com/FSL5CS/telecommunicationsmemo (Sept. 1, 2004)
("The FCC's appeal of the Brand X decision raises significant legal and policy issues that
may be of significant interest to the Court."); see also Botein, supra note 12, at 342 n.136.
(stating the Supreme Court of the United States will consider and grant a petition for a writ
of certiorari "only when there are special and important reasons therefore" such as "[w]hen
a United States court of appeals has rendered a decision in conflict with the decision of an-
other United States court of appeals on the same matter.., or has so far departed from the
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings.") (quoting Sup. Ct. R. 10).
292 BrandXlnternet Service, 345 F.3d at 1131. But see FCC Petition, supra note 278, at
1 ("Whether, under the framework set out in Chevron ... the FCC was entitled to decide
that, for purposes of regulation under the 1996 Act, cable operators offering so-called 'cable
modem service' provide only an 'information service' and not a 'telecommunications ser-
vice'."); see also NCTA Petition, supra note 282, at 1 ("Whether the court of appeals erred
in holding that the FCC had impermissibly concluded that cable modem service is an 'in-
formation service,' without a separately regulated telecommunications service component,
under the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. 151 et seq.").
293 Richard W. Murphy, A "New" Counter-Marbury: Reconciling Skidmore Deference
and Agency Interpretive Freedom, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 31 (2004); see also Richard J.
Pierce, Jr., Reconciling Chevron and Stare Decisis, 85 GEO. L. J. 2225, 2253 (1997) ("The
circuits that have considered the issue have split on what rule to adopt."). See, e.g., Heim-
mermann v. First Union Mortgage Corp., 305 F.3d 1257, 1263 (1 1th Cir. 2002) ("Courts
generally must defer to an agency statutory interpretation that is at odds with circuit prece-
dent, so long as the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.")
(internal quotation marks omitted); Aguirre v. INS, 79 F.3d 315, 317 (2d Cir. 1996) (New-
man, J.) ("We have concluded that the interests of nationwide uniformity outweigh our ad-
herence to Circuit precedent in this instance ... Accordingly, we have sought and obtained
the concurrence of the [prior] panel to abandon that precedent... "); Reich v. D.M. Sabia
Co., 90 F.3d 854, 858 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting Joshua); Satellite Broad. & Communications
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sue for the Supreme Court that Brand X raised centers on the Ninth Circuit's
broad interpretation of the Neal rule. The Supreme Court in Neal stated that
"once we have determined a statute's meaning, we adhere to our ruling under
the doctrine of stare decisis, and we assess an agency's later interpretation of
the statute against that settled law." '294 The Ninth Circuit stated that, "there is
nothing to suggest that Neal's rule should apply only when it is the Supreme
Court (and not the courts of appeals) construing the statute in question and the
Court itself has never asserted that the power to authoritatively interpret stat-
utes belongs to it alone." '295 This broad interpretation of the Neal rule by the
Ninth Circuit failed to realize that the Neal Court used the phrase "once we
have" rather than "once courts have." '296 The Supreme Court will be asked if
there are in fact pressing reasons for limiting Neal.297 The Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals may get a definitive answer from the Supreme Court stating circuit
Ass'n v. Oman, 17 F.3d 344, 348 (11 th Cir. 1994) ("Because we did not address the 'clear
meaning' of [the statute] in [our prior precedent], this circuit is not precluded from revisiting
our initial interpretation of the regulatory scheme in [our prior precedent]."); Schisler v.
Sullivan, 3 F.3d 563, 568 (2d Cir. 1993) (Winter, J.) ("New regulations at variance with
prior judicial precedents are upheld unless they exceeded the Secretary's authority or are
arbitrary and capricious.") (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted); United States v.
Joshua, 976 F.2d 844, 855 (3rd Cir. 1992) ("Where a prior panel of this court has interpreted
an ambiguous statute in one way, and the responsible administrative agency later resolves
the ambiguity another way, this court is not bound to close its eyes to the new source of
enlightenment. In addition to securing the expertise of the agency, this approach tends to
promote uniformity in the application of the statute."); Chemical Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. EPA,
873 F.2d 1477, 1482 n.* (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Ginsburg, C.J.) ("Our discussion rejecting [prior
circuit precedent] has been separately circulated to and approved by the entire court, and
thus constitutes the law of this court"). Contra Bankers Trust N.Y. Corp. v. United States,
225 F.3d 1368, 1374-75 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (adhering to judicial precedent articulated in Neal
"apply equally to decisions rendered by circuit courts of appeal"); Indus. TurnAround Corp.
v. NLRB, 115 F.3d 248, 254 (4th Cir. 1997) ("We are precluded from adopting [the
agency's interpretation] as the law of the Circuit because it stands in conflict with ... a prior
panel opinion of this court."); BPS Guard Servs., Inc. v. NLRB, 942 F.2d 519, 523 (8th Cir.
1991) ("Chevron does not stand for the proposition that administrative agencies may reject,
with impunity, the controlling precedent of a superior judicial body.").
294 Neal v. U.S., 516 U.S. 284, 295 (1996); see NCTA Petition, supra note 282, at 22
("Commentators have criticized Neal's dictum as incompatible with Chevron's principle
that statutory silence or ambiguity signals a delegation of decision-making authority to the
responsible agency."); see e.g., Russell L. Weaver, The Emperor Has No Clothes: Christen-
sen, Mead and Dual Deference Standards, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 173, 192 (2002) (allowing
stare decisis to prevail over deference is "strikingly inconsistent with Chevron's underlying
principles"); Kenneth A. Bamberger, Provisional Precedent: Protecting Flexibility in Ad-
ministrative Policymaking, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1272, 1319 (2002) ("Denying agencies poli-
cymaking power when the judiciary rules on an issue first freezes in place decisions made
by an institution with an avowedly inferior ability to assess social conditions and without the
constitutional capacity to make political choices.") (footnote omitted).
295 Brand X Internet Services v. FCC, 345 F.3d 1120, 1132 (9th Cir. 2003).
296 Neal, 516 U.S. at 295.
297 See generally NCTA Petition, supra note 282, at 23.
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courts may not usurp administrative decisions by citing to stare decisis. 9
Several parties agree that the decision by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
to create communications policy had tremendous repercussions with national
importance. Although the court vacated the FCC's Declaratory Ruling treating
cable modem as an information service in Brand X, it was its prior decision in
AT&T v. Portland that resulted in inappropriate policymaking from the judicial
branch. The Supreme Court may end up not addressing the substance of the
Commission's findings and conclusions regarding cable modem. Instead, the
Court may rule that the Ninth Circuit Court applied the wrong law. The Jus-
tices could remand the case back to the West Coast with instructions to apply a
Chevron deference standard outlined by the Court, perhaps clarifying its posi-
tion under the Neal rule and requiring a "substantive review regardless of the
Portland precedent." '299 Thereafter, we may be left with regulatory uncertainty
that will not benefit communications policy or the economy. At the end of the
day, the Ninth Circuit in a possible BrandXH may find under Chevron defer-
ence that "the FCC still got it wrong," meaning more appeals to come."°
VI. CHALLENGING THE FCC'S FINAL ORDER
A. Exclusive Provisions Under the 1996 Act for Procedural and
Administrative Review
Parties to an FCC proceeding that wish to challenge the Commission any
U.S. Court of Appeals can file petitions for review under 28 U.S.C. §2342 for
any rulemaking procedure, policy statements and most non-licensing orders
under 47 U.S.C. §402(a) where a petitioner can establish venue."' Appeals of
application proceedings, such as licensing decisions, as well as providing long-
distance service between two local exchange carriers in different regions under
47 U.S.C. §271 ("interLATA"), may be filed only in the U.S. Court of Appeals
298 If administrative findings and orders become persuasive authority and courts can
establish what the law should be prior to any FCC decisions, then parties and the courts
could frustrate the reason why Congress set up expertise administrative bodies. This would
be setting the cart before the horse.
299 Reed Business Information, DOJ Wants Freedom for Broadband, at
http://www.americasnetwork.com/americasnetwork/articledetail.jsp?id=121627 (Sept. 23,
2004). For example, the Supreme Court may decide: (1) the Neal rule applies only to Su-
preme Court decisions, (2) the 1996 Act was silent or ambiguous when classifying informa-
tion services, and therefore (3) the Ninth Circuit should only conduct a Chevron step two
analysis in determining whether the FCC's finding in the Cable Declaratory Ruling were
reasonable.
300 Id.
301 28 U.S.C. §2342(1) (2000); see also 47 U.S.C. §402(a) (2000).
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for the District of Columbia Circuit under 47 U.S.C. §402(b). °2 These two
Communications Act provisions are "mutually exclusive," meaning the issue
comes down to the FCC's licensing powers or rulemaking process.0 3 Al-
though judicial review under both provisions differ as to the FCC's authority,
"[m]any statutes and [procedural] rules... apply to both." ' 04
The D.C. Circuit is perceived as the defacto specialized court in communi-
cations law because of its exclusive jurisdiction under §402(b)."5 Even though
the court hears the majority of licensing cases, many appeals under §402(a)
such as rulemaking and policy matters also end up in the D.C. Circuit.3"6 As
Professor Botein points out, "some litigants still prefer the D.C. Circuit over
other Courts of Appeal, because of its perceived 'pro-regulatory' jurispru-
dence-which may have waned somewhat in recent years."30 7 However, after
the passage of the 1996 Act, this perception quickly evaporated. 308
As previously discussed in this Comment, "new technology" has been a
problem for the court's members. As former Chief Justice Taft once com-
302 Id. §402(b).
303 Botein, supra note 12, at 320, n. 18; see also Cook, Inc. v. United States, 394 F.2d 84,
86 (7th Cir. 1968) ("[A]ppeals from orders of the Commission in exercising its 'licensing
powers' must be taken to the District of Columbia Circuit. All other orders fall within the
general coverage of §402(a). Sections 402(a) and (b) are mutually exclusive."); see also
Vernal Enter., Inc. v. F.C.C., 355 F.3d 650, 655-57 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
304 See Botein, supra note 12, at 322-23, 330.
305 Id. at 322. Although accepted as the defacto specialized court in communications
law, Professor Botein states that "the need for this type of defacto specialized court is less
than clear today." Id. at 324. However, this statement was made prior to the 1996 Act, and
I would argue more than ever that this exclusive jurisdiction is merited, especially since
there is legislative history indicating Congress has given the D.C. Circuit exclusive jurisdic-
tion over other pressing national issues. See supra notes 12, 35 and accompanying text.
306 See United States Telecomm. Ass'n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554, 564 (D.C. Cir. 2004); see
also Fox Television Stations v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1048 (D.C. Cir. 2002); see also Tex.
Utilities Elec. Co. v. FCC, 997 F.2d 925 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
307 Id. at 322.
308 Compare United States Telecomm. Ass'n v. F.C.C. 359 F.3d 554, 564 (2004) ("Vari-
ous CLECs, state commissions, and an association of state utility consumer advocates filed
petitions for review in several other circuits; these petitions were transferred to the Eight
Circuit under the random lottery procedure established in 28 U.S.C §2112(a)(3), and trans-
ferred to this court by the Eight Circuit under 28 U.S.C. §2112(a)(5)); with Fox Television
Stations v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1048 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (construing the 1996 Act to "carr[y[
with it a presumption in favor of repealing or modifying the ownership rules.") amended by,
293 F.3d 537, 540 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding that the FCC had not sufficiently explained its
reasons for retaining either the national television owners rule set at thirty five percent by
Congress and its cable/broadcast cross-ownership rule after determining that both rules re-
mained "necessary in the public interest.") and Sinclair Broad. Group, Inc. v. FCC, 284
F.3d 148, 152 (D.C. Cir. 2002) ("Commission has failed to demonstrate that its exclusion of
non-broadcast media in the eight voices exception [to the local ownership rule] is not arbi-
trary and capricious.., remand the local ownership rule to the Commission for further con-
sideration.").
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plained, "interpreting the law on this subject is something like trying to inter-
pret the law of the occult. It seems like dealing with something supernatu-
ral. 3 °9 Most people reading the 1996 Act while trying to interpret Congres-
sional intent have marched to court to figure out the "supernatural." While
federal judges today may feel like Justice Taft when he said, "I want to put this
off as long as possible in the hope that it becomes more understandable," the
number of cases involving the FCC and communications law litigated in the
D.C. Circuit shows why they should be considered the de facto specialized
court by other circuit courts.3 '
When Congress passed the 1996 Act, they extended the D.C. Circuit's ex-
clusive jurisdiction under 47 U.S.C. §402 (b) to include section (9), which
says, "By any applicant for authority to provide interLATA services under sec-
tion 271 of this Act whose application is denied by the Commission."3' The
principal reason for passage of the Act was "to foster a competitive market in
telecommunications" and Congress wanted to make sure litigated issues in-
309 Botein, supra note 12, at 324.
310 Botein, supra note 12, at 324-25. See generally U. S. Telecomm. Ass'n v. FCC, 359
F.3d 554 (D.C. Cir. 2004), cert. denied Nat'l Ass'n of Regulatory Utility Com'rs v. U.S.
Telecomm. Ass'n, 125 S. Ct. 313 (2004). Compare generally AT&T Corp. v Iowa Utilities
Board, 525 U.S. 366 (1999); with U.S. Telecomm. Ass'n v. FCC, 290 F.3d 415 (D.C. Cir.
2002), cert. denied WorldCom, Inc. v. U.S. Telecomm. Ass'n, 538 U.S. 940 (2003). All of
these cases implicated national communications policy, and they came before the court ei-
ther under 47 U.S.C. §402(b)(9) because Congress gave the D.C. Circuit exclusive jurisdic-
tion over the interLATA issues raised by these cases or under 28 U.S.C. §2115(a)(5), trans-
ferring related cases filed in other circuit courts to the D.C. Circuit. See U. S. Telecomm.
Ass'n, 359 F.3d at 564 ("ILECs filed two mandamus petitions with this Court ... and in
addition filed a petition for review here. Various CLECs [and other parties] filed petitions
for review in several other circuits; these petitions were transferred to the Eight Circuit un-
der the random lottery procedure (28 U.S.C. §2112(a)(3)) and then transferred to this court
(under 28 U.S.C. §2115(a)(5)"); see also In re Heritage Cablevision Assoc. of Dallas, L.P,
and Texas Cable TV Ass'n, Inc. v. Tex. Utilities Elec. Co., Memorandum Opinion and Or-
der, 6 FCC Rcd. 7099 (1991) (finding cable operator providing commingled traditional
(video) and nontraditional cable service such as broadband communications and data trans-
mission services, including data transmission on a commingled, merited a single regulated
pole attachment by utility pole owner), recon. dismissed, 7 FCC Rcd. 4192 (1992), affd sub
nom. Tex. Utilities Elec. Co. v. FCC, 997 F. 2d 925 (D.C. Cir. 1993). The D.C. Circuit
Court got acquainted with commingled cable services carrying traditional video and non-
video communications long before passage of the 1996 Act.
311 47 U.S.C. §402(b)(9) (2000). The statute states, in relevant part, that parties can ap-
peal a Commission order to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
in nine various instances, including §402(b)(9): "by any applicant for authority to provide
interLATA services under section 271 of this Act whose application is denied by the Com-
mission." Id. Section 402(b) was amended under the 1996 Act to include section (9). See
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 107, §276 (1996). It
implicated an issue of national policy (local and long distance calling) since the 1996 Act
was passed specifically to open up competition in phone service. See U.S Telecomm. Ass "n
v. FCC, 359 F.3d at 561. Congress could once again amend 47 U.S.C. §402(b) to include a
section (10) which pertains to national broadband policy.
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volving telecommunications exchange carriers would be heard in a uniform
way.3 2 Congress added §271 to the 1996 Act specifying the conditions under
which a Bell Operating Company (BOC) could provide interLATA services. 3
For example, the Commission required a BOC apply for authorization pursuant
to §271(d) in order to provide long distance services in an in-region State.3 4
FCC approval depended on the BOC's agreements with competitors on inter-
connection and open access." 5
B. Litigated Outcome Based on Venue "Lottery"
When parties file a judicial challenge to a federal agency order, venue for
these litigated cases will be proper in any federal circuit where the case has
been filed under the Hobbs Act. This is true for most federal agency rules be-
cause "many statutes do not specify a particular circuit as the court to handle
these challenges." 3 6 Venue is described as "the judicial circuit in which the
petitioner resides or has its principal office, or the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit."3 7 Unlike the exclusive jurisdiction found in
§402(b) that restricts parties to file in the D.C. Circuit, 28 U.S.C. §2342(1) and
47 U.S.C. §402(a) provides several fora for litigants.3 8 Until recently, this en-
couraged a "race to the courthouse" because 28 U.S.C. §2112, prior to its
amendment in 1988, contained a "first to file" rule that stated "the proper cir-
cuit of venue would be the circuit where the appeal of the agency was first
filed."3"' During the 1980s, when the debate over deregulating communica-
tions law began, FCC decisions were challenged on "ideological overlays" -
and the race was on to choose either a "liberal, pro-regulation court [or] a con-
servative pro-market court.'"320
Congress amended 28 U.S.C. §2112 to do away with the "first to file" rule
and instead established a procedure "for judicial review of an agency order
312 See generally U. S. Telecomm. Ass'n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554, 561-64 (2004).
313 See BellSouth Corp. v. FCC, 162 F.3d 678 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (upholding the constitu-
tionality of §271).
314 47 C.F.R. §53.101 (2005); see AT&T v. FCC, 220 F.3d 607, 633 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(upholding the first Commission approval of a section 271 application).
315 BellSouth Corp., 162 F. 3d at 692-93 (D.C. Cir. 1998); see also U.S. West Communi-
cations, Inc. v. FCC, 177 F. 3d 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1999), cert denied, 528 U.S. 1188 (2000).
316 S. REP. No. 100-263, at 2 (1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3198.
317 28 U.S.C. §2342 (2000).
318 Botein, supra note 12, at 336.
319 S. REP. No 100-263, at 2(1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3198; See generally
Nicholas Fels, Beyond the Stopwatch: Determining Appellate Venue on Review of FERC
Orders, I ENERGY L. J. 35, 42 (1980) (citing various problems that occurred with litigants
standing at the courthouse doors waiting to be the first to file).
320 Botein, supra note 12, at 337.
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[that has] been filed in more than one circuit. '32 ' The Judicial Panel on Multi-
district Litigation (Judicial Panel) would establish a lottery to choose from the
various petitions filed for review. Congress did not intend "to change the prac-
tice of having sequential or closely related orders issued in the course of the
same or interrelated administrative proceedings treated as 'the same order' and
reviewed by the circuit court reviewing the initial order. '322 Any court selected
by the Judicial Panel has the authority under 28 U.S.C. §2112(a)(5) to transfer
cases to another proper circuit "for the convenience of the parties in the interest
of justice.3 23 The history of the FCC's contentious Triennial Review concern-
ing incumbent local exchange carrier's obligations under 47 U.S.C. §251(c)(3),
(d) to unbundled network elements (UNEs) and make available to competitive
local exchange carriers is a good indication of how experienced the D.C. Cir-
cuit Court has become with Congressional and FCC communications policy.32 4
In U.S. Telecommunications Association, many parties challenging the FCC
Triennial Review filed petitions for review in several circuits, but eventually
these cases were consolidated in the Eight Circuit under 28 U.S.C. §21 12(a)(3)
and then transferred to the D.C. Circuit under 28 U.S.C. §2112(a)(5).
VII. CONCLUSION: WHY THE D.C. CIRCUIT SHOULD GET THE
FINAL WORD ON BROADBAND
A national broadband policy that implements Congress's desire to deregu-
late telecommunications in the U.S. will help entrepreneurs develop new ways
of communications using the Internet, thus giving consumers greater choice
through innovation. Emerging broadband technologies such as VoIP, BPL,
video over IP, wireless broadband and fiber will help the U.S. economy grow
as the communications infrastructure expands, eventually resulting in greater
market competition. Congress established the FCC to develop a detailed
communications policy that benefits both industry and consumers. A ubiqui-
tous broadband deployment should neither depend on a "powerball" circuit
court selection through lottery when appealing an FCC decision nor should it
depend on jurists who may not be familiar with the intricacies of communica-
321 S. REP. No 100-263, at 4 (1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3198, 3201.
322 Id. at 5, reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3198, 3202.
323 28 U.S.C. §2112(a)(5) (2002); see S. REP. No 100-263, at 5 (1987), reprinted in 1987
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3198, 3202
The selected court will retain its existing power to transfer all review proceedings deal-
ing with the same order. Thus, S. 1134 does not, in any way, prevent the selected court
from transferring the challenges to the agency order to a more proper circuit "for the
convenience of the parties in the interest of justice."
Id. (emphasis added).
324 U. S. Telecomm. Ass'n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554 (D.C. Cir. 2004), cert. denied Nat'l
Ass'n of Regulatory Utility Com'rs v. U.S. Telecomm. Ass'n, 125 S. Ct. 313 (2004).
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tions policy. Under the Hobbs Act and 47 U.S.C. §402(a) current posture, par-
ties from multiple industries impacted negatively by the FCC's national broad-
band efforts will continue to challenge such decisions in various circuit courts.
These challenges may end up balkanizing national policy because the various
circuit courts will invariably decide an FCC appeal through different analysis,
defeating national purpose uniformity. In the interest of justice, efficiency, and
a Congressional intent to consolidate similar subject-matter litigation into one
federal forum, circuit courts should defer broadband related litigation to the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia because of their
expertise in the field. However, it may be unrealistic to expect that all judicial
matters involving national communications policy will be voluntarily trans-
ferred from one appeals court to the D.C. Circuit becomes some judges may
want to interject their "judicial objectivity" into matters of such national im-
portance.
Congress has begun to re-examine the Communications Act and may soon
revise portions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 to confront various
problems surrounding emerging technologies. One solution Congress might
consider is the creation of a regulatory class for Internet Protocol-enabled
broadband networks that keeps various services and applications free of federal
and state regulation. In order to keep such Internet-based services from admin-
istrative and judicial uncertainty therefore, legislation should be introduced
that would amend 47 U.S.C. §402(b)(l)-(9) and add a new (10) that gives the
D.C. Circuit exclusive jurisdiction over issues related to broadband, classified
and regulated by the FCC as an "information" service."' The United States
economy stands to benefit tremendously from national deregulatory policies
that involve the widespread deployment of high-speed Internet access. The
eleven circuit court benches that often replace Congress' communications pol-
icy judgment with their own should not frustrate this growth.
325 Connected on the Go: Broadband Goes Wireless, Report by the Wireless Broadband
Access Task Force in Dkt. No. 04-163, at 6-7 (Mar. 8, 2005) (suggesting a pro-competitive,
deregulatory framework for spectrum based broadband and consider classifying wireless
broadband as "information service."); see Vonage Order, supra note 35.
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